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International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology

ICISC 2011: Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2011 pp 490–509Cite as

Sufficient Condition for Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Resilient to Leakage of Secret Keys

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7259))

Abstract

In this paper, we provide a sufficient condition, called admissible polynomials, to construct a two-pass identity-based authenticated key exchange (ID-AKE) protocol secure in the identity-based extended Canetti-Krawczyk (id-eCK) model. The proposed ID-AKE protocol is secure under the gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. NTT Information Sharing Platform Laboratories, 3-9-11 Midori-cho, Musashino-shi, Tokyo, 180-8585, Japan

    Atsushi Fujioka & Koutarou Suzuki

Authors
  1. Atsushi Fujioka
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  2. Koutarou Suzuki
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. (A06) 6503 School of Computer Science and Engineering, Pusan National University, San-30, JangJeon-Dong, 609-735, GeumJeong-Gu, Busan, South Korea

    Howon Kim

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Fujioka, A., Suzuki, K. (2012). Sufficient Condition for Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Resilient to Leakage of Secret Keys. In: Kim, H. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2011. ICISC 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7259. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31912-9_32

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31912-9_32

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-31911-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-31912-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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