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Reduction in Lossiness of RSA Trapdoor Permutation

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Book cover Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering (SPACE 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7644))

Abstract

We consider the lossiness of RSA trapdoor permutation studied by Kiltz, O’Neill and Smith in Crypto 2010. In Africacrypt 2011, Herrmann improved the cryptanalytic results of Kiltz et al. In this paper, we improve the bound provided by Herrmann, considering the fact that the unknown variables in the central modular equation of the problem are not balanced. We provide detailed experimental results to justify our claim. It is interesting that in many situations, our experimental results are better than our theoretical predictions. Our idea also extends the weak encryption exponents proposed by Nitaj in Africacrypt 2012.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Indian Statistical Institute, 203 B T Road, Kolkata, 700 108, India

    Santanu Sarkar

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  1. Santanu Sarkar
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. ESAT/SCD/COSIC, KU Leuven, Kasteelpart Arenberg 10, 3001, Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium

    Andrey Bogdanov

  2. IIIT Delhi, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase III, 110020, New Delhi, India

    Somitra Sanadhya

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Sarkar, S. (2012). Reduction in Lossiness of RSA Trapdoor Permutation. In: Bogdanov, A., Sanadhya, S. (eds) Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering. SPACE 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7644. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34416-9_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34416-9_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-34415-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-34416-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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