Abstract
Multi-attribute auctions allow agents to sell and purchase goods and services taking into account more attributes besides the price (e.g. service time, tolerances, qualities, etc.). The coexistence of different attributes in the auction mechanism increases the difficulty of determining the winner and its payment. multi-criteria functions can be used to deal with the problem of determining the auction winner. However, in order to make the payment possible, multi criteria functions must fulfill certain conditions. In this paper we discuss which properties must satisfy a multi-criteria function so it can be used to determine the winner of a multi-attribute auction and we experimentally show how the valuation function choice conditions the behavior of the auction mechanism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Chevaleyre, Y., Dunne, P., Endriss, U., Lang, J., Lemaïtre, M., Maudet, N., Padget, J., Phelps, S., Rodrïguez-aguilar, J., Sousa, P.: Issues in multiagent resource allocation. Informatica 30 (2006)
Krishna, V.: Auction Theory. Academic Press (March 2002)
Neumann, J.V., Morgenstern, O.: Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press (1944)
Lehman, D., Muller, R., Sandholm, T.: The Winner Determination Problem, ch. 12. MIT Press (2006)
Che, Y.K.: Design competition through multidimensional auctions. The RAND Journal of Economics 24(4), 668–680 (1993)
MacKie-Mason, J.K., Varian, H.R.: Generalized vickrey auctions (1994)
Conitzer, V.: Algorithms and theory of computation handbook, p. 16. Chapman & Hall/CRC (2010)
Smith, R.: The contract net protocol: High-level communication and control in a distributed problem solver. IEEE Transactions on Computers C-29(12), 1104–1113 (1980)
Parsons, S., Rodriguez-Aguilar, J.A., Klein, M.: Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists. ACM Comput. Surv. 43(2), 10:1–10:59 (2011)
Parkes, D.C., Kalagnanam, J.: Iterative multiattribute vickrey auctions. Management Science 51, 435–451 (2005)
Zhao, D., Zhang, D., Perrussel, L.: Mechanism design for double auctions with temporal constraints. In: IJCAI, pp. 472–477 (2011)
Athey, S., Ellison, G.: Position auctions with consumer search. Forthcoming Quarterly Journal of. Economics 126(3), 1213–1270 (2011)
Krishna, V.: Auction Theory. Academic Press/Elsevier (2009)
Varian, H.R.: Position auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization 25(6), 1163–1178 (2007)
Ramchurn, S.D., Mezzetti, C., Giovannucci, A., Rodriguez-Aguilar, J.A., Dash, R.K., Jennings, N.R.: Trust-based mechanisms for robust and efficient task allocation in the presence of execution uncertainty. J. Artif. Int. Res. 35, 119–159 (2009)
Pla, A., Lopez, B., Melendez, J., Gay, P.: Petri net based agents for coordinating resources in a workflow management system. In: ICAART, Rome, Italy, pp. 514–523 (February 2011)
Pla, A., López, B.: Truthful bidding prove for multiatribute auctions. Research report IIiA 12-01-rr, Institute of Informatics and Applications, University of Girona (in press, 2012)
Lee, J., Szymanski, B.: A novel auction mechanism for selling time-sensitive e-services. In: IEEE Conference on ECommerce Technology (CEC 2005), pp. 75–82 (2005)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Pla, A., Lopez, B., Murillo, J. (2012). Multi Criteria Operators for Multi-attribute Auctions. In: Torra, V., Narukawa, Y., López, B., Villaret, M. (eds) Modeling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence. MDAI 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 7647. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34620-0_29
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34620-0_29
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-34619-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-34620-0
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)