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Practical Multi-party Versions of Private Set Intersection Protocols with Hardware Tokens

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Computer Applications for Communication, Networking, and Digital Contents (FGCN 2012)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 350))

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Abstract

The objective of the private set intersection (PSI) protocol is that the participants want to compute the intersection based on their private input sets without revealing to another party any additional information about their respective sets. Several protocols for PSI have been proposed. In this paper we focus on the practical symmetric-key based PSI protocols using the hardware tokens, and extend the 2-party PSI protocols of [7] and [5] to the m-party versions where m > 2 by adopting the untrusted third party model. Our protocols achieve the same level of security as the original 2-party protocols, and are very efficient compared with the prior general framework.

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Kang, JS., Yi, OY., Kim, MK., Chang, KY. (2012). Practical Multi-party Versions of Private Set Intersection Protocols with Hardware Tokens. In: Kim, Th., Ko, Ds., Vasilakos, T., Stoica, A., Abawajy, J. (eds) Computer Applications for Communication, Networking, and Digital Contents. FGCN 2012. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 350. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35594-3_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35594-3_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35593-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35594-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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