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Analysis and Construction of Efficient RFID Authentication Protocol with Backward Privacy

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Advances in Wireless Sensor Networks (CWSN 2012)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 334))

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Abstract

Privacy of RFID systems is receiving increasing attentions in the RFID community and an important issue required as to the security of RFID system. Backward privacy means the adversary can not trace the tag later even if he reveals the internal states of the tag sometimes before. In this paper, we analyze two recently proposed RFID authentication schemes: Randomized GPS and Randomized Hashed GPS scheme. We show both of them can not provide backward privacy in Juels and Weis privacy model, which allows the adversary to know whether the reader authenticates the tag successfully or not. In addition, we present a new protocol, called Challenge-Hiding GPS, based on the Schnorr identification scheme. The challenge is hidden from the eavesdropping through the technique of Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. The new protocol can satisfy backward privacy, and it has less communication overheads and almost the same computation, compared with the two schemes analyzed.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Computer, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing, 210046, China

    Shaohui Wang, Sujuan Liu & Danwei Chen

  2. Network and Data Security Key Laboratory of Sichuan Province, China

    Shaohui Wang, Sujuan Liu & Danwei Chen

Authors
  1. Shaohui Wang
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  2. Sujuan Liu
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  3. Danwei Chen
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. College of Computer, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, 66 Xin Mofan Road, Mailbox 157, 210003, Nanjing, China

    Ruchuan Wang  & Fu Xiao  & 

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Wang, S., Liu, S., Chen, D. (2013). Analysis and Construction of Efficient RFID Authentication Protocol with Backward Privacy. In: Wang, R., Xiao, F. (eds) Advances in Wireless Sensor Networks. CWSN 2012. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 334. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36252-1_43

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36252-1_43

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-36251-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-36252-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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