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Stronger Security Model for Public-Key Encryption with Equality Test

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Pairing-Based Cryptography – Pairing 2012 (Pairing 2012)

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Abstract

In CT-RSA 2010, Yang et al. suggested a new category of probabilistic public-key encryption (PKE) schemes, called public-key encryption with equality test (PKET), which supports searching on ciphertexts without decrypting them. Typical applications include management of encrypted data in an outsourced database. They presented a construction in bilinear groups, and proved that it is one-way against chosen ciphertext attack (OW-CCA) in the random oracle model. We argue that OW-CCA security may be too weak for database applications, because partial information leakage from the ciphertext is not considered in the model. In this paper, we revisit the security models for PKET, and introduce a number of new security definitions. To remark, the weakest of our definitions is still stronger than OW-CCA. We then investigate relations among these security definitions. Finally, to illustrate the usefulness of our definitions, we analyze the security of a PKET scheme [24], showing the scheme actually provides much stronger security than that was proven previously.

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Lu, Y., Zhang, R., Lin, D. (2013). Stronger Security Model for Public-Key Encryption with Equality Test. In: Abdalla, M., Lange, T. (eds) Pairing-Based Cryptography – Pairing 2012. Pairing 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7708. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36334-4_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36334-4_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-36333-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-36334-4

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