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NASA Formal Methods Symposium

NFM 2013: NASA Formal Methods pp 398–412Cite as

Verifying a Privacy CA Remote Attestation Protocol

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 7871))

Abstract

As the hardware root-of-trust in a trusted computing environment, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) warrants formal specification and verification. This work presents results of an effort to specify and verify an abstract TPM 1.2 model using PVS that is useful for understanding the TPM and verifying protocols that utilize it. TPM commands are specified as state transformations and sequenced to represent protocols using a state monad. Postconditions and invariants are specified for individual commands and validated by verifying a Privacy CA attestation protocol. All specifications are written and verified automatically using the PVS decision procedures and rewriting system.

This work was sponsored in part by the Battelle Memorial Institute under PO US001-0000328568.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Information and Telecommunication Technology Center, The University of Kansas, USA

    Brigid Halling & Perry Alexander

Authors
  1. Brigid Halling
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  2. Perry Alexander
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. NASA Ames Research Center, M/S 269-2, Moffett Field, 94035-0001, CA, USA

    Guillaume Brat

  2. Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies Inc., NASA Ames Research Center, M/S 269-2, Moffett Field, 94035-0001, CA, USA

    Neha Rungta

  3. NASA Ames Research Center, Carnegie Mellon University, M/S 269-2, Moffett Field, 94035-0001, CA, USA

    Arnaud Venet

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Halling, B., Alexander, P. (2013). Verifying a Privacy CA Remote Attestation Protocol. In: Brat, G., Rungta, N., Venet, A. (eds) NASA Formal Methods. NFM 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7871. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38088-4_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38088-4_27

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-38087-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-38088-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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