Abstract
This paper proposes an extension of fault sensitivity analysis based on clockwise collision. The original FSA attack uses the fault injections to exploit the sensitivity of calculations against the fault injections. While the clockwise collision fault sensitivity analysis (CC-FSA) uses the fault injections to detect the occurrence of the clockwise collision and to recover the secret key. Clockwise collision is a phenomenon for iterative hardware circuits, which leads to nearly impossible setup-time violations. Take an AES S-box as an instance, clockwise collision occurs when the S-box inputs for two consecutive clock cycles are identical in value. As a result, the combinational circuit in the second clock cycle has almost no signal toggle and a negligible critical path delay. This paper proposes and verifies the concept of CC-FSA using the clock-glitch-based fault injections and an unprotected AES implementation. We investigate the key recovery method for CC-FSA with a noisy data set and we consider CC-FSA can help the previous collision-based model-less FSA attack to identify the final 8-bit secret information without additional data and negligible computational overhead.
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Li, Y., Ohta, K., Sakiyama, K. (2013). An Extension of Fault Sensitivity Analysis Based on Clockwise Collision. In: Kutyłowski, M., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7763. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38519-3_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38519-3_4
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