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Enhancing Passive Side-Channel Attack Resilience through Schedulability Analysis of Data-Dependency Graphs

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Network and System Security (NSS 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7873))

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Abstract

In this work, we provide an evaluation of the fitness of a cipher implementation for automated, low overhead, Side Channel Attack (SCA) countermeasure insertion through instruction re-scheduling. This evaluation is automated by means of an extension to the Clang/LLVM compiler framework and is thus amenable to be performed on a generic cipher implementation in C.

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References

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Agosta, G., Barenghi, A., Pelosi, G., Scandale, M. (2013). Enhancing Passive Side-Channel Attack Resilience through Schedulability Analysis of Data-Dependency Graphs. In: Lopez, J., Huang, X., Sandhu, R. (eds) Network and System Security. NSS 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7873. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38631-2_58

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38631-2_58

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-38630-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-38631-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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