Abstract
We study a simple electronic boardroom voting system. While most existing systems rely on opaque electronic devices, a scientific committee of a research institute (the CNRS Section 07) has recently proposed an alternative system. Despite its simplicity (in particular, no use of cryptography), each voter can check that the outcome of the election corresponds to the votes, without having to trust the devices.
In this paper, we present three versions of this system, exhibiting potential attacks. We then formally model the system in the applied pi-calculus, and prove that two versions ensure both vote correctness (even if the devices are corrupted) and ballot secrecy (assuming the devices are honest).
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant agreement no 258865, project ProSecure.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Abadi, M., Fournet, C.: Mobile values, new names, and secure communication. In: 28th ACM Symp. on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL 2001), pp. 104–115 (2001)
Adida, B.: Helios: web-based open-audit voting. In: 17th Conference on Security Symposium, SS 2008, pp. 335–348. USENIX Association (2008)
Benaloh, J., Tuinstra, D.: Receipt-free secret-ballot elections. In: Proceedings of the 26th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 1994), pp. 544–553. ACM (1994)
Bernhard, D., Cortier, V., Pereira, O., Warinschi, B.: Measuring vote privacy, revisited. In: 19th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2012), Raleigh, USA. ACM (October 2012)
Clarkson, M.R., Chong, S., Myers, A.C.: Civitas: Toward a secure voting system. In: 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 354–368 (2008)
Cortier, V., Smyth, B.: Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy. In: 24th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 2011), pp. 297–311 (2011)
Cortier, V., Wiedling, C.: A formal analysis of the norwegian E-voting protocol. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J.D. (eds.) POST 2012. LNCS, vol. 7215, pp. 109–128. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
Delaune, S., Kremer, S., Ryan, M.: Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols. Journal of Computer Security 17(4), 435–487 (2009)
Feldman, A., Halderman, A., Felten, E.: Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine. In: 2007 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop, EVT 2007 (2007)
Fujioka, A., Okamoto, T., Ohta, K.: A practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections. In: Zheng, Y., Seberry, J. (eds.) AUSCRYPT 1992. LNCS, vol. 718, pp. 244–251. Springer, Heidelberg (1993)
Groth, J.: Efficient maximal privacy in boardroom voting and anonymous broadcast. In: Juels, A. (ed.) FC 2004. LNCS, vol. 3110, pp. 90–104. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Hao, F., Ryan, P.Y.A., Zielinski, P.: Anonymous voting by two-round public discussion. IET Information Security 4(2), 62–67 (2010)
Juels, A., Catalano, D., Jakobsson, M.: Coercion-resistant electronic elections. In: Chaum, D., Jakobsson, M., Rivest, R.L., Ryan, P.Y.A., Benaloh, J., Kutylowski, M., Adida, B. (eds.) Towards Trustworthy Elections. LNCS, vol. 6000, pp. 37–63. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Kremer, S., Ryan, M.D., Smyth, B.: Election verifiability in electronic voting protocols. In: Gritzalis, D., Preneel, B., Theoharidou, M. (eds.) ESORICS 2010. LNCS, vol. 6345, pp. 389–404. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Küsters, R., Truderung, T., Vogt, A.: Verifiability, Privacy, and Coercion-Resistance: New Insights from a Case Study. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2011), pp. 538–553. IEEE Computer Society (2011)
Küsters, R., Truderung, T., Vogt, A.: Clash Attacks on the Verifiability of E-Voting Systems. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2012), pp. 395–409. IEEE Computer Society (2012)
Liu, J.: A proof of coincidence of labeled bisimilerity and observational equivalence in applied pi calculus. Technical report (2011)
Schneier, B.: Applied Cryptography, ch. 6. John Wiley & Sons (1996)
Wolchok, S., Wustrow, E., Halderman, J.A., Prasad, H.K., Kankipati, A., Sakhamuri, S.K., Yagati, V., Gonggrijp, R.: Security analysis of India’s electronic voting machines. In: 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2010 (2010)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Arnaud, M., Cortier, V., Wiedling, C. (2013). Analysis of an Electronic Boardroom Voting System. In: Heather, J., Schneider, S., Teague, V. (eds) E-Voting and Identify. Vote-ID 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7985. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39185-9_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39185-9_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-39184-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-39185-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)