

# Economics of Information Security and Privacy

Tyler Moore • David J. Pym • Christos Ioannidis  
Editors

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# Preface

The Workshop on the Economics of Information Security was established in 2002 to bring together computer scientists and economists to understand and improve the poor state of information security practice. WEIS was borne out of a realization that security often fails for non-technical reasons. Rather, the incentives of both defender and attacker must be considered. Earlier workshops have answered questions ranging from finding optimal levels of security investment to understanding why privacy has been eroded. In the process, WEIS has attracted participation from the diverse fields such as law, management and psychology. WEIS has now established itself as the leading forum for interdisciplinary scholarship on information security.

The eighth installment of the conference returned to the United Kingdom, hosted by University College London on June 24-25, 2009. Approximately 100 researchers, practitioners and government officials from across the globe convened in London to hear presentations from authors of 21 peer-reviewed papers, in addition to a panel and keynote lectures from Hal Varian (Google), Bruce Schneier (BT Counterpane), Martin Sadler (HP Labs), and Robert Coles (Merrill Lynch). Angela Sasse and David Pym chaired the conference, while Christos Ioannidis and Tyler Moore chaired the program committee.

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