Skip to main content

Computer-Aided Security Proofs

  • Conference paper
  • 1198 Accesses

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 8054))

Abstract

Probabilistic programs provide a convenient formalism for defining probability distributions and have numerous applications in computer science. In particular, they are used pervasively in code-based provable security for modeling security properties of cryptographic constructions as well as cryptographic assumptions. Thanks to their well-defined semantics, probabilistic programming languages provide a natural framework to prove the correctness of probabilistic computations. Probabilistic program logics are program logics that allow to reason formally about executions of probabilistic programs, and can be used to verify complex probabilistic algorithms.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Almeida, J.B., Barbosa, M., Bangerter, E., Barthe, G., Krenn, S., Zanella-Béguelin, S.: Full proof cryptography: verifiable compilation of efficient zero-knowledge protocols. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 488–500. ACM (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Almeida, J.B., Barbosa, M., Barthe, G., Dupressoir, F.: Certified computer-aided cryptography: efficient provably secure machine code from high-level implementations. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/316 (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Barthe, G., Crespo, J.M., Grégoire, B., Kunz, C., Lakhnech, Y., Schmidt, B., Zanella-Béguelin, S.: Automated analysis and synthesis of padding-based encryption schemes. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/695 (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Barthe, G., Grégoire, B., Heraud, S., Béguelin, S.Z.: Computer-aided security proofs for the working cryptographer. In: Rogaway, P. (ed.) CRYPTO 2011. LNCS, vol. 6841, pp. 71–90. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Barthe, G., Grégoire, B., Zanella-Béguelin, S.: Formal certification of code-based cryptographic proofs. In: 36th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, POPL 2009, pp. 90–101. ACM, New York (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Barthe, G., Köpf, B., Olmedo, F., Zanella-Béguelin, S.: Probabilistic relational reasoning for differential privacy. In: 39th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, POPL 2012, pp. 97–110. ACM, New York (2012)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Barthe, G. (2013). Computer-Aided Security Proofs. In: Joshi, K., Siegle, M., Stoelinga, M., D’Argenio, P.R. (eds) Quantitative Evaluation of Systems. QEST 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8054. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40196-1_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40196-1_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40195-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40196-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics