Abstract
We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good match with a neighboring player. We consider the existence, computation, and inefficiency of stable matchings from which no pair of players wants to deviate. When the benefits from a match are the same for both players, we show that incorporating the well-being of other players into their matching decisions significantly decreases the price of stability, while the price of anarchy remains unaffected. Furthermore, a good stable matching achieving the price of stability bound always exists and can be reached in polynomial time. We extend these results to more general matching rewards, when players matched to each other may receive different utilities from the match. For this more general case, we show that incorporating social context (i.e., “caring about your friends”) can make an even larger difference, and greatly reduce the price of anarchy. We show a variety of existence results, and present upper and lower bounds on the prices of anarchy and stability for various matching utility structures.
This work was supported by DFG grant Ho 3831/3-1 and in part by NSF grants CCF-0914782 and CCF-1101495.
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Anshelevich, E., Bhardwaj, O., Hoefer, M. (2013). Friendship and Stable Matching. In: Bodlaender, H.L., Italiano, G.F. (eds) Algorithms – ESA 2013. ESA 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8125. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40450-4_5
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