Abstract
This paper presents logics for reasoning about sound enough evidence and its relation to evidence and knowledge. The logic of sound enough evidence is based on van Benthem and Pacuit’s evidence logic and Holliday’s formalization of Nozick’s tracking theory. And the newly defined knowledge based on sound enough evidence does not imply the evidence-based belief but respects the epistemic closure. The related philosophical issues are also discussed.
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References
Cornelisse, I.: Context dependence of epistemic operators in dynamic evidence logic. Master’s thesis, University of Amsterdeam, ILLC (2011)
Holliday, W.: Knowing what follows: epistemic closure and epistemic logic. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University (2012)
Nozick, R.: Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press (1981)
Van Benthem, J., Pacuit, E.: Dynamic logics of evidence-based beliefs. Studia Logica 99, 61–92 (2011)
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Shi, C. (2013). Logic of Evidence-based Knowledge. In: Grossi, D., Roy, O., Huang, H. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8196. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_31
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_31
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40947-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40948-6
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