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Desynchronization and Traceability Attacks on RIPTA-DA Protocol

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Radio Frequency Identification (RFIDSec 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8262))

Abstract

Recently Gao et al. proposed a lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol [3] to resist against intermittent position trace attacks and desynchronization attacks and called it RIPTA-DA. They also verified their protocol’s security by data reduction method with the learning parity with noise (LPN) and also formally verified the functionality of the proposed scheme by Colored Petri Nets. In this paper, we investigate RIPTA-DA’s security. We present an efficient secret disclosure attack against the protocol which can be used to mount both de-synchronization and traceability attacks against the protocol. Thus our attacks show that RIPTA-DA protocol is not a RIPTA-DA.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We note that [3] does not clearly state that \(H(.)\) is a hash function. However, for other protocols discussed in this paper the authors have used this notation for a hash function, e.g. [3, p. 1951]. Therefore we take it that \(H\) denotes a hash function in the calculation of \(\mu \). It must be noted that the details of \(H(.)\) have no impact on the success probability of the attacks presented in this paper.

References

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank anonymous reviewers for useful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Electrical Engineering Department, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University, Tehran, Iran

    Nasour Bagheri

  2. Innovation Labs Hyderabad, Tata Consultancy Services Limited, Hyderabad, India

    Praveen Gauravaram

  3. Electrical Engineering Department, Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran

    Masoumeh Safkhani

  4. Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology, Delhi, India

    Somitra Kumar Sanadhya

Authors
  1. Nasour Bagheri
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  2. Praveen Gauravaram
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  3. Masoumeh Safkhani
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  4. Somitra Kumar Sanadhya
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nasour Bagheri .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Technische Universität Graz, Graz, Austria

    Michael Hutter

  2. Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria

    Jörn-Marc Schmidt

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Bagheri, N., Gauravaram, P., Safkhani, M., Sanadhya, S.K. (2013). Desynchronization and Traceability Attacks on RIPTA-DA Protocol. In: Hutter, M., Schmidt, JM. (eds) Radio Frequency Identification. RFIDSec 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8262. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41332-2_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41332-2_4

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-41331-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-41332-2

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