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Preface

This volume contains the papers and extended abstracts for work presented at WINE 2013: The 9th Conference on Web and Internet Economics held during December 11–14, 2013, at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.

Over the past decade, researchers in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics have joined forces to tackle problems involving incentives and computation. These problems are of particular importance in application areas like the Web and the Internet that involve large and diverse populations. The Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) is an interdisciplinary forum for the exchange of ideas and results on incentives and computation arising from these various fields.

WINE 2013 built on the success of the Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, which had the same acronym, WINE. The workshop was held annually from 2005 to 2012 and published archival proceedings. To accommodate the growing research interests and emphasize its archival nature, WINE was renamed a conference with the same acronym in 2013.

WINE 2013 received 150 submissions. All submissions were rigorously peer-reviewed and evaluated on the basis of originality, soundness, significance, and exposition. The committee decided to accept 36 papers. The program also included four invited talks by Dirk Bergemann (Yale University), Joe Halpern (Cornell University), Ehud Kalai (Microsoft Research and Northwestern University), and Eva Tardos (Cornell University). In addition, WINE 2013 featured four tutorials on December 11: Price of Anarchy in Auctions, by Jason Hartline (Northwestern University), Online Behavioral Experiments, by Andrew Mao (Harvard University) and Siddharth Suri (Microsoft Research), Budget Feasible Mechanisms, by Nick Gravin (Microsoft Research) and Yaron Singer (Harvard University), and Computational Social Choice, by Lirong Xia (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute).

We would like to thank Microsoft Research, Facebook, and Google Research for their generous financial support to WINE 2013 and Harvard University for hosting the event. We thank David Parkes, the general chair of the conference, and Ann Marie King for their excellent local arrangements work and Andrew Mao for his help with the conference website.

We also acknowledge the work of the Program Committee, Anna Kramer at Springer for helping with the proceedings, and the EasyChair paper management system.

October 2013

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