Abstract
Matching and coalition formation are fundamental problems in a variety of scenarios where agents join efforts to perform tasks, such as, e.g., in scientific publishing. To allocate credit or profit stemming from a joint project, different communities use different crediting schemes in practice. A natural and widely used approach to profit distribution is equal sharing, where every member receives the same credit for a joint work. This scheme captures a natural egalitarian fairness condition when each member of a coalition is critical for success. Unfortunately, when coalitions are formed by rational agents, equal sharing can lead to high inefficiency of the resulting stable states.
In this paper, we study the impact of changing profit sharing schemes in order to obtain good stable states in matching and coalition formation games. We generalize equal sharing to sharing schemes where for each coalition each player is guaranteed to receive at least an α-share. This way the coalition formation can stabilize on more efficient outcomes. In particular, we show a direct trade-off between efficiency and equal treatment. If k denotes the size of the largest possible coalition, we prove an asymptotically tight bound of k 2 α on prices of anarchy and stability. This result extends to polynomial-time algorithms to compute good sharing schemes. Further, we show improved results for a novel class of matching problems that covers many well-studied cases, including two-sided matching and instances with integrality gap 1.
Supported by DFG Cluster of Excellence MMCI and grant Ho 3831/3-1.
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Hoefer, M., Wagner, L. (2013). Designing Profit Shares in Matching and Coalition Formation Games. In: Chen, Y., Immorlica, N. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8289. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_21
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