Abstract
We investigate the issues of existence and efficiency of lookahead equilibria in congestion games. Lookahead equilibria, whose study has been initiated by Mirrokni et al. [10], correspond to the natural extension of pure Nash equilibria in which the players, when making use of global information in order to predict subsequent reactions of the other ones, have computationally limited capabilities.
This work was partially supported by the PRIN 2010–2011 research project ARS TechnoMedia: “Algorithmics for Social Technological Networks” funded by the Italian Ministry of University.
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Bilò, V., Fanelli, A., Moscardelli, L. (2013). On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games. In: Chen, Y., Immorlica, N. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8289. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_6
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