

An Improved Interactive Streaming Algorithm for the Distinct Elements Problem

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Abstract

The exact computation of the number of distinct elements (frequency moment F_0) is a fundamental problem in the study of data streaming algorithms. We denote the length of the stream by n where each symbol is drawn from a universe of size m . While it is well known that the moments F_0, F_1, F_2 can be approximated by efficient streaming algorithms [1], it is easy to see that exact computation of F_0, F_2 requires space $\Omega(m)$. In previous work, Cormode et al. [11] therefore considered a model where the data stream is also processed by a powerful helper, who provides an interactive proof of the result. They gave such protocols with a polylogarithmic number of rounds of communication between helper and verifier for all functions in NC. This number of rounds ($O(\log^2 m)$ in the case of F_0) can quickly make such protocols impractical.

Cormode et al. also gave a protocol with $\log m + 1$ rounds for the exact computation of F_0 where the space complexity is $O(\log m \log n + \log^2 m)$ but the total communication $O(\sqrt{n} \log m (\log n + \log m))$. They managed to give $\log m$ round protocols with $\text{polylog}(m, n)$ complexity for many other interesting problems including F_2 , Inner product, and Range-sum, but computing F_0 exactly with polylogarithmic space and communication and $O(\log m)$ rounds remained open.

In this work, we give a streaming interactive protocol with $\log m$ rounds for exact computation of F_0 using $O(\log m (\log n + \log m \log \log m))$ bits of space and the communication is $O(\log m (\log n + \log^3 m (\log \log m)^2))$. The update time of the verifier per symbol received is $O(\log^2 m)$.

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1 Introduction

In a seminal work [1] Alon, Matias and Szegedy studied the space complexity of both approximating the frequency moments of a data stream and computing them exactly. Streaming algorithms are usually designed to handle large data sets, and the algorithm should be able to process each data element with small time overhead, and should have small working space as well. For instance one of the striking results of Alon et al. is that the second frequency moment F_2 can be approximated up to a constant factor using only $O(\log n + \log m)$ space by a randomized algorithm, where m is the size of the universe and n is the stream length. The interested reader is referred to the survey by Muthukrishnan [23]. Other problems studied in the data stream model include graph problems like matching and triangle counting [6, 12].

It is known that the frequency moments F_j for integer $j > 2$ are hard to even approximate by any streaming algorithm, i.e., any streaming algorithm giving a good approximation must have large space [5]. Motivated by this and the paradigm of cloud computing one can study new models where a helper/prover is introduced. The hope is that while some problems require a lot of space to solve by an unassisted streaming algorithm, a helper who is not space restricted and sees the stream in the same way as the verifier might not only be able to *compute* the result, but be able to *convince* the client/verifier of the correctness of that result by providing a proof that can be verified by the client using small space only. In the past few years, there have been numerous papers [7–11, 20] investigating this idea.

Thus we have the following scenario: both the prover and client observe the stream. The client, who is severely space restricted, computes a sketch of the data. The prover, having no space restriction, can store the entire stream, compute the answer, and send it to the client. But the prover may not be honest, e.g. the prover may have incentives to not provide the correct answer. The client uses the sketch of the data to reject wrong claims with high probability. The prover can be thought of as an internet company which offers cloud computing services and operates huge data warehouses. The only formal restriction on the prover is that he cannot predict the future parts of the stream. From now on, we refer to the client as the verifier.

Besides many upper bounds provided in the papers cited above, one can also show lower bounds against this model of prover assisted data streaming algorithms. Data streaming protocols can be simulated by Arthur-Merlin communication protocols, where Merlin is the prover and the data stream input is split across some players, who together constitute the verifier Arthur. Arthur-Merlin communication complexity was first introduced by Babai, Frankl and Simon [3] and was studied in greater detail by Klauck [18, 19]. These lower bounds have been used by Chakrabarti et al. [7] to give non-trivial lower bounds on approximating and computing exactly the k -th frequency moments for large enough k , in the setting where the proof provided is noninteractive, i.e., the prover provides an “annotation” to the data stream that is then verified without further interaction. Unfortunately analyzing model of interactive proofs with many rounds between prover and verifier in communication complexity seems to be out of reach for current techniques in communication complexity.

One of the fundamental problems in data streaming is to compute the number of distinct elements in a data stream, which is the zeroth frequency moment and is denoted

by F_0 . This problem has many application in areas such as query optimization, IP routing and data mining (See the references cited in [17] for details). By a simple reduction from the disjointness function [25], it is easy to get a lower bound of $\Omega(m)$ (assuming $m = \theta(n)$) on the streaming complexity of computing the exact number of distinct elements by a data streaming algorithm without a prover. If we require exact F_0 and the verifier's space to be sublinear, we have to look at the prover-verifier model.

By appealing to Klauck's [18] result on the MA complexity of disjointness, there is a lower bound on $hv = \Omega(m)$ to compute F_0 exactly in the online MA model as defined in [7], where h is the help cost and v is the space used by the streaming algorithm. Cormode et al. [11] gave interactive streaming protocols with $\log m$ rounds for various interesting problems like frequency moments, the Index function and computing Inner Products. They also gave a general purpose protocol that computes every function in NC with polylogarithmic space, communication and rounds. For the case of exactly computing F_0 , the general purpose protocol uses $O(\log^2 m)$ rounds, which can very quickly become impractical. Hence the authors also describe a protocol using only $\log m$ rounds, where the help cost (i.e., communication) is not polylogarithmic in m and n . We improve their protocol so that both the communication h and the space v are polylogarithmic in m and n , while using only $\log m$ rounds of interaction.

1.1 Previous Work

Let m be the universe size and n be the length of the stream. Although we later state our complexity results in terms of m and n , *in this subsection, for simplicity, we assume m and n are roughly of the same order of magnitude*, i.e. $m = \text{poly}(n)$ following the previous works in [10, 11]. It is known that approximating F_0 up to a $(1 \pm \epsilon)$ multiplicative factor can be done in $O(\epsilon^{-2} + \log m)$ space using randomization, which is optimal as well [17].

Goldwasser, Kalai and Rothblum [14] proposed a delegation general purpose interactive protocol for log-space uniform \mathcal{NC} circuits. Their protocol was presented formally in the streaming setting by Cormode, Mitzenmacher, and Thaler [10]. We state their results below for easy reference.

Fact 1. [Theorem 3.1 from [10]]

Let f be a function over an arbitrary field \mathbf{F} that can be computed by a family of $O(\log S(n))$ -space uniform arithmetic circuits (over \mathbf{F}) of fan-in 2, size $S(n)$ and depth $d(n)$. Then in the streaming model with a prover, there is a protocol which requires $O(d(n) \log S(n))$ rounds such that the verifier needs $O(\log S(n) \log |\mathbf{F}|)$ bits of space and the total communication between the prover and the verifier is $O(d(n) \log S(n) \log |\mathbf{F}|)$.

As a result of Fact 1, if we use the general purpose interactive protocol of [14] to compute F_0 exactly, it will require $\Omega(\log^2 m)$ rounds of interaction between the prover and verifier. Cormode, Mitzenmacher, and Thaler [10] gave an alternative interactive protocol for F_0 based on linearization, whereby the prover is more efficient in terms of running time. Their protocol requires $\log^2 m$ rounds where the verifier's space is $O(\log^2 m)$ bits and the total communication is $O(\log^3 m)$.

As far as we know, the only interactive protocol which uses $\log m$ rounds to compute F_0 is given in [11]. We note that the results stated in [11] assumed that $m = n$. We have

worked out the complexity of their protocol in terms of m and n in Appendix A. Restating the complexity of the F_0 protocol in [11] in terms of m and n , the space of the verifier is $O(\log m \log n + \log^2 m)$ and the total communication is $O(\sqrt{n} \log m (\log n + \log m))$. Compared to the other protocols (e.g. F_2 and INDEX) given in [11], the total communication is not polylogarithmic in m and n . We briefly explain why the communication blows up to $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$ in Section 1.2.

Chakrabarti et al. [7,9] studied the situation in which the prover provides a (lengthy) annotation/proof to the verifier after the data stream has ended. The verifier processes the annotation in a streaming fashion. This corresponds to randomized checking of noninteractive proofs (in the theory of interactive proofs such systems are called Merlin Arthur games, because a powerful party that is not trusted (Merlin) sends a single message to a skeptical and computationally limited verifier (Arthur)). For the exact computation of F_0 in this model, the help cost, h and the verifier's space, v are both $O(m^{2/3} \log m)$.

In other related work, Gur and Raz [15] gave a Arthur-Merlin-Arthur(AMA) streaming protocol for computing F_0 exactly with both h and v being $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{m})$ (where \tilde{O} hides a $\text{polylog}(m, n)$ factor). Klauck and Prakash [20] studied a restricted interactive model where the communication between the prover and verifier has to end once the stream is already seen. Very recently, Chakrabarti et al. [8] presented constant-rounds streaming interactive protocols with logarithmic complexity for several query problems, including the well studied INDEX problem.

1.2 Previous Results and Our Techniques

First, we briefly describe why the protocol of [11] for computing F_0 fails to have total communication polylogarithmic in m and n . It is easy to see that $F_0 = \sum_{i=1}^m h(f_i)$ where $f_i := |\{j \mid a_j = i\}|$ and $h : \mathbf{N} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is given by $h(0) = 0$ and $h(x) = 1$ for $1 \leq x \leq n$. Since h depends on $n+1$ points, the degree the polynomial \tilde{h} , obtained via interpolation, is at most n , where \tilde{h} agree with h on $\{0, 1, \dots, n\}$. If one was to naively apply the famous sum-check protocol of Lund et al. [22], the degree of the polynomial communicated at each round would be $O(n)$. This is even worse than the trivial protocol in which the prover either sends the frequency vector $f := (f_1, \dots, f_m)$ or the sorted stream, with a cost of $\tilde{O}(\min(m, n))$. Since the proof is just a sorted stream, its correctness can be checked by standard fingerprinting techniques as described in [20]. One obvious way to rectify this would be to reduce the degree of the polynomial to be communicated at each round. One way to reduce the degree of \tilde{h} is to remove all heavy hitters¹ from the stream, so that the degree of \tilde{h} can be made small (because $h(x)$ may take any value for large x), which in turn means that the communication will be low. The heavy hitter protocol in [11] however uses a lot of communication just to identify all the heavy hitters, which causes the communication cost in their protocol to be high. In this work, we also reduce the degree of the polynomial to be communicated at each round. But instead of removing the heavy hitters, we write F_0 as a different formula. Such an approach was first used by Gur and Raz [15] to obtain an AMA-protocol for exact F_0 . Here, the main technical point is to replace the OR function on n variables which has high degree with a approximating polynomial over a smaller finite field \mathbf{F}_q , so that this new polynomial has low degree. Such approximating polynomials were first constructed in [26,27] to prove circuit lower

¹Those items whose frequencies exceed a fraction of n .

bounds. The degree of the approximating polynomial $p : \mathbf{F}_q^n \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_q$ depends on q . But choosing q to be small forces us to work inside the field \mathbf{F}_q , and the arithmetic will be correct modulo q . Hence, F_0 will be calculated modulo q . Note that we cannot choose $q > m$ as the approximating polynomial degree will be larger than m . By choosing the first $\log m$ primes, we can compute F_0 modulo these $\log m$ many primes with the help and verifier's cost being polylogarithmic in m and n (see Lemma 3). This does not increase the number of rounds because all these executions can be done in parallel. The exact value of F_0 can be constructed by the Chinese Remainder Theorem. As a result of decreasing the degree of the polynomial, our protocol no longer has perfect completeness. By parallel repetition, the probability that a honest prover succeeds can be made close to 1.

We now compare our results with previously known non-interactive and interactive protocols that compute F_0 exactly. For comparison purposes, we assume that $m = \theta(n)$. The results are collected in Table 1. We note that if we fix the number of rounds to $\log m$, our work improves the total communication from $O(\sqrt{m} \log^2 m)$ to $O(\log^4 m (\log \log m)^2)$, while only increasing the the verifier's space by a multiplicative factor of $\log \log m$. For practical purposes, the authors in [11] argue that the number of rounds in the general purpose construction of [14], which is $\Omega(\log^2 m)$, may be large enough to be offputting. All the other protocols Cormode et al. [11] devise only require $\log m$ rounds. In an article in Forbes [13] in 2013, it was reported that the National Security Agency's data center in Utah will reportedly be capable of storing a yottabyte² of data. For a yottabyte-sized input, this corresponds to about 80 rounds of interaction if one uses a protocol with $\log m$ rounds. For a protocol with $\log^2 m$ rounds, more than 6000 rounds of interaction are needed.

Recently, Chakrabarti et al. [8] have designed a streaming interactive protocol for the INDEX function³ with two messages⁴ where both space and communication are only $O(\log n \log \log n)$. Previous work gave a $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$ protocol in the this online MA model [7], whereas in [11], a $\log n$ round interactive protocol with $O(\log n \log \log n)$ space and communication is given. Since for the INDEX function, there is a two message protocol with only $O(\log n \log \log n)$ complexity⁵, one may ask whether a similar kind of protocol is possible for F_0 or other frequency moments. It is however easy to see that for $k \neq 1$, the k -th frequency moment, F_k is as hard as the Disjointness function. In any online communication protocol for the Disjointness function with 2 and 3 messages, there is a lower bound of $\Omega(n^{1/2})$ and $\Omega(n^{1/3})$ respectively [8]. Hence, it is not possible to compute F_0 exactly using only 1, 2 or 3 messages with communication and space polylogarithmic in m and n . How about using a constant number of r messages, where $r \geq 4$, to get communication and space polylogarithmic in m and n ? It is believed that this is not possible: due to the recent results in [8], if Disjointness on n bits can be solved with a constant number of rounds and polylogarithmic complexity in the online one-way

²One yottabyte is 10^{24} bytes.

³The input stream consists of n bits x_1, \dots, x_n , followed by a integer $j \in [n]$.

⁴The first message is from the verifier to the prover and this message depends on the stream and the verifier's private randomness. The second message is from the prover to the verifier, which depends on the stream and the message received from the verifier. In general, for a k message protocol, Merlin always sends the last message in the interaction.

⁵The complexity of a protocol is defined as the sum of the space used and the total communication needed.

Paper	Space	Total Communication	Number of Rounds
[7]	$m^{2/3} \log m$	$m^{2/3} \log m$	1
[10]	$\log^2 m$	$\log^3 m$	$\log^2 m$
[11]	$\log^2 m$	$\sqrt{m} \log^2 m$	$\log m$
This work	$\log^2 m \log \log m$	$\log^4 m (\log \log m)^2$	$\log m$

Table 1: Comparison of our protocol to previous protocols for computing the exact number of distinct elements in a data stream. The results are stated for the case where $m = \theta(n)$. The complexities of the space and the total communication is correct up to a constant.

communication model, then the (ordinary) AM communication complexity of Disjointness will also be $\text{polylog}(n)$, which is unlikely, since Disjointness is the generic co-NP complete problem in communication complexity [3]. Hence, constant round protocols ($r \geq 4$) for $F_k (k \neq 1)$ with polylogarithmic complexity probably do not exist, but the current techniques in communication complexity (i.e., providing strong lower bound on the AM communication complexity of Disjointness) are not sufficient to prove this.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Data Streaming Model

In this subsection we define our model of streaming computations with a helper/prover.

We assume that in general the input is given as a data stream $\sigma = \langle a_1, \dots, a_n \rangle$ of elements from a universe $\{1, \dots, m\}$. The a_i are sometimes referred to as symbols.

In our model we consider two parties, the prover, and the verifier. Both parties are able to access the data stream one element at a time, consecutively, and synchronously, i.e., no party can look into the future with respect to the other one. The verifier is a Turing machine that has space bounded by $\text{polylog}(m, n)$, and processes each symbol in time $\text{polylog}(m, n)$.

The prover is a Turing machine that has unlimited workspace, and processes each symbol in some time $T(m, n)$ that will vary from problem to problem. Ideally we want $T(m, n)$ to be $\text{polylog}(m, n)$ as well, but this would imply immediately that the problem at hand can be solved in quasilinear time which could be too restrictive for some problems like computing the rank of a matrix.

After the stream has ended, the verifier and prover engage in a conversation to verify the correctness of some function $f(\sigma)$. The message that the prover sends to the verifier is viewed as a stream and the verifier need not store this message. He can do some computations with the message on the fly. In complexity theory, this is also known as the interactive proof model, see for instance Chapter 8 in [2]. In the interactive proof model in complexity theory, the prover is given unlimited power. But in our case, we want the honest prover to be able to execute our protocols efficiently. We require the verifier to run in total time $\min\{m, n\} \cdot \text{polylog}(m, n)$, and the prover to run in time $\min\{m, n\} \cdot T(m, n)$. This makes the protocol efficient for practical delegation purposes.

Now, we are ready to define a valid protocol that verifies the correctness of some

function $f(\sigma)$. We follow closely from previous works in [10,11].

Definition 1. *Before seeing the stream σ , both the prover \mathcal{P} and verifier \mathcal{V} agree on a protocol to solve $f(\sigma)$. This protocol should fix all the variables that are to be used (e.g. Type of codes, size of finite fields etc.), but should not use randomness to fix these variables. If they need to choose an object from a given family according to some distribution, the verifier will choose this object and communicate the result to the prover.*

After the stream ends, both \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} exchange some messages between each other. The message from \mathcal{P} to \mathcal{V} need not be stored but can be treated and processed as a stream. We denote the output of \mathcal{V} on input σ , given prover \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} 's private randomness \mathcal{R} , by $\text{out}(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}, \sigma)$. During any phase of the interaction, \mathcal{V} can output \perp if \mathcal{V} is not convinced that \mathcal{P} 's claim is valid.

We say \mathcal{P} is a valid prover if for all streams σ ,

$$Pr_{\mathcal{R}} [\text{out}(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{R}, \sigma) = f(\sigma)] \geq 1 - \epsilon_c.$$

We say \mathcal{V} is a valid verifier for f if there is at least one valid prover \mathcal{P} , and for all provers \mathcal{P}' and all streams σ ,

$$Pr_{\mathcal{R}} [\text{out}(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}', \mathcal{R}, \sigma) \notin \{f(\sigma), \perp\}] \leq \epsilon_s.$$

ϵ_c is known as the completeness error, the probability that the honest prover will fail even if he follows the protocol. If $\epsilon_c = 0$, we say the protocol has perfect completeness. ϵ_s is called the soundness error, that is no prover strategy will cause the verifier to output a value outside of $\{f(\sigma), \perp\}$ with probability larger than ϵ_s . In this work, we take $\epsilon_c = \epsilon_s = \frac{1}{3}$. By standard boosting techniques, these probabilities can be made arbitrary close to 1 [2].

The main complexity measure of the protocol is the space requirement of the verifier and the total communication between the verifier and the prover. We make the following definition which takes into account these complexities.

Definition 2. *We say there is a (h, v) streaming interactive protocol (SIP) with r rounds that computes f , if there is a valid verifier \mathcal{V} for f such that:*

1. \mathcal{V} has only access to $O(v)$ bits of working memory.
2. There is a valid prover \mathcal{P} for \mathcal{V} such that \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} exchange at most $2r$ messages in total, and the sum of the length of all messages is $O(h)$ bits.

Given any SIP, we define its complexity to be $h + v$.

The online Merlin-Arthur(OMA) model is one where the protocol is non-interactive, in which a single message is sent from the prover to the verifier after the stream ends. As before, \mathcal{V} is given private randomness. Following definition 2, we define

$$OMA(f) = \min \{ h + v \mid \text{there is a } (h, v) \text{ online MA protocol that computes } f \}.$$

2.2 Coding Theory

We begin with some brief background from coding theory which we use in this paper. For more details of standard definitions, the reader is referred to [28]. A q -ary linear code \mathcal{C} of length n is a linear subspace of \mathbf{F}_q^n , where q is some prime power. If \mathcal{C} has dimension k , then we call it a $[n, k]_q$ code. The (Hamming) distance between two codewords $x, y \in \mathcal{C}$, denoted by $d(x, y)$ is the number of indices $i \in [n]$ such that $x_i \neq y_i$. The distance of the code is defined as the minimum distance over all pairs of distinct codewords in \mathcal{C} . If the minimum distance of the code is d , we denote it by $[n, k, d]_q$. The generator matrix $G \in \mathbf{F}_q^{n \times k}$ of the code is a n by k matrix where the column span of G gives \mathcal{C} . The relative distance of the code is d/n and the rate of the code is k/n . A linear code is called a good code if both its relative distance and rate is at most some constant. The Reed-Solomon code is an example of a good code with alphabet size $q = n + 1$. But in our case, we need the alphabet size to be much smaller than n . Justesen codes [16] is a class of good codes with a constant alphabet size. We say that a linear code is locally logspace constructible if the (i, j) -entry of the generator matrix G can be constructed using space $O(\log n)$. It is known that Justesen codes are locally logspace constructible (see Lemma 3.3 of [21]).

3 Our Result

Given a multiset presented as a stream $\sigma = \langle a_1, \dots, a_n \rangle$, where each $a_i \in [m]$, we give an interactive protocol with $\log m$ rounds which computes F_0 exactly. For each $j \in [m]$ and $i \in [n]$, we denote $\chi_i(j)$ to be the element indicator of element j at position i of the stream, i.e. $\chi_i : [m] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that $\chi_i(j) = 1 \Leftrightarrow a_i = j$. We can also interpret each $\chi_i : \{0, 1\}^{\log m} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ by associating each $j \in [m]$ with its binary expansion. It is easy to see that

$$\begin{aligned} F_0 &= \sum_{j=1}^m \left(\bigvee_{i=1}^n \chi_i(j) \right) \\ &= \sum_{x_1 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{x_d \in \{0,1\}} \text{OR}(\chi(x_1, \dots, x_d)) \end{aligned}$$

where $d = \log m$, $\chi : \{0, 1\}^d \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is

$$\chi(x_1, \dots, x_d) := (\chi_1(x_1, \dots, x_d), \dots, \chi_n(x_1, \dots, x_d)).$$

and $\text{OR} : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is the OR function on n variables.

Following the ideas of [22], we consider the low degree extension of χ_i over a larger field. Let q be a prime and λ an integer to be determined later. We extend the domain of χ_i from \mathbf{F}_2^d to $\mathbf{F}_{q^\lambda}^d$. If we denote $\theta_\sigma : [m] \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_2^d$ where $\theta_\sigma(i) = (a_i^{(1)}, \dots, a_i^{(d)})$ is the binary expansion of a_i , then the extension $\tilde{\chi}_i : \mathbf{F}_{q^\lambda}^d \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_{q^\lambda}$ is given by

$$\tilde{\chi}_i(x_1, \dots, x_d) := \prod_{j=1}^d \left[(2a_i^{(j)} - 1) x_j + (1 - a_i^{(j)}) \right]. \quad (1)$$

Note that $\tilde{\chi}_i(x_1, \dots, x_d) = \chi_i(x_1, \dots, x_d)$ for all $x \in \mathbf{F}_2^d$. Similarly, define $\tilde{\chi} : \mathbf{F}_{q^\lambda}^d \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_{q^\lambda}^n$ in the natural way:

$$\tilde{\chi}(x_1, \dots, x_d) := (\tilde{\chi}_1(x_1, \dots, x_d), \dots, \tilde{\chi}_n(x_1, \dots, x_d)).$$

With this notation,

$$F_0 = \sum_{x_1 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{x_d \in \{0,1\}} \text{OR}(\tilde{\chi}(x_1, \dots, x_d)). \quad (2)$$

Running the sum-check protocol naively to (2) would require the prover to send a degree n polynomial at each round. We replace the OR function in (2) with a low degree polynomial which approximates the OR function with high probability. This idea was first introduced in [24,27] and was also used in [15] to obtain an AMA protocol for exact F_0 .

Lemma 1. *Using $O(L \log n)$ bits of randomness, we can construct a polynomial $p : \mathbf{F}_q^n \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_q$ of individual degree at most $L(q-1)$, such that for every $x \in \{0,1\}^d$,*

$$\Pr [p(\tilde{\chi}(x_1, \dots, x_d)) = \text{OR}(\tilde{\chi}(x_1, \dots, x_d))] \geq 1 - \frac{1}{6m \log m},$$

where L is the least integer such that

$$\left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^L \leq \frac{1}{6m \log m}. \quad (3)$$

Proof. Start with a $[\zeta n, n, \frac{1}{3}\zeta n]_q$ -linear code \mathcal{C} , where $\zeta > 1$ is a constant to be chosen such that \mathcal{C} exist⁶. Let G be the generator matrix of \mathcal{C} . Choose uniformly at random $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_L \in [\zeta n]$ where L is the least integer that satisfies (3) and define

$$p(x_1, \dots, x_n) := 1 - \prod_{i=1}^L [1 - ((Gx)_{\alpha_i})^{q-1}].$$

It is easy to see that the individual degree of p is at most $L(q-1)$. By properties of the code \mathcal{C} , for any $x \in \{0,1\}^n$,

$$\Pr_{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_L} \left[p(x) \neq \bigvee_i x_i \right] \leq \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^L \leq \frac{1}{6m \log m}.$$

□

We note that $L = O(\log m)$.

Since \mathbf{F}_{q^λ} can be viewed as a vector space over \mathbf{F}_q , we can view $p : \mathbf{F}_q^n \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_q$ as $\tilde{p} : \mathbf{F}_{q^\lambda}^n \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_{q^\lambda}$, by applying p componentwise. By the union bound, the probability that

$$\Pr \left[F_0 \pmod{q} = \sum_{x_1 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{x_d \in \{0,1\}} \tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}(x_1, \dots, x_d)) \right] \geq 1 - \frac{1}{6 \log m}. \quad (4)$$

⁶Justesen codes [16] are one example of a family of codes which have both constant relative distance and constant rate.

We first give a interactive protocol to compute $F_0 \pmod{q}$ with high probability. Let $q \leq 2 \log m \log \log m + 2$ be a prime and λ be the smallest integer such that $q^{\lambda-1} \geq 6Ld \log m$. Before observing the stream, the prover and verifier agree on the code \mathcal{C} as in Lemma 1. The verifier chooses $O(L \log n)$ random bits to define the polynomial \tilde{p} and sends this randomness to the prover. The verifier chooses randomly $r \in \mathbf{F}_{q^\lambda}^d$ and computes $\tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}(r_1, \dots, r_d))$ in a streaming fashion. We now illustrate how the verifier computes $\tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}(r_1, \dots, r_d))$ given a one-pass over the stream without storing the whole input.

For $1 \leq i \leq n$, let $y_i = (y_i^{(1)}, \dots, y_i^{(\lambda)})$ where $y_i = \tilde{\chi}_i(r_1, \dots, r_d)$ and each $y_i^{(j)} \in \mathbf{F}_q$. Each y_i can be computed when a_i is seen in the stream using (1).

Then

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}(r_1, \dots, r_d)) &= \tilde{p}(y_1, \dots, y_n) \\ &= \left(p \begin{bmatrix} y_1^{(1)} \\ \vdots \\ y_n^{(1)} \end{bmatrix}, \dots, p \begin{bmatrix} y_1^{(\lambda)} \\ \vdots \\ y_n^{(\lambda)} \end{bmatrix} \right) \end{aligned}$$

We show how to compute $p \begin{bmatrix} y_1^{(j)} \\ \vdots \\ y_n^{(j)} \end{bmatrix}$ for any $1 \leq j \leq \lambda$ in a streaming fashion. For

$1 \leq j \leq \lambda$ and $1 \leq i \leq L$, \mathcal{V} needs to compute

$$\begin{aligned} B_{ij} &= \left(G \begin{bmatrix} y_1^{(j)} \\ \vdots \\ y_n^{(j)} \end{bmatrix} \right)_{\alpha_i} \\ &= \left(G \begin{bmatrix} y_1^{(j)} \\ 0 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \right)_{\alpha_i} + \dots + \left(G \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \\ y_n^{(j)} \end{bmatrix} \right)_{\alpha_i} \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

This can be done given a one pass over the stream σ , each time \mathcal{V} observes a new entry a_k , he updates

$$B_{ij} \leftarrow B_{ij} + y_k^{(j)} \cdot g_{\alpha_i, k}.$$

Note that the computation of $y_k^{(j)}$ depends only on a_k and the verifier need not store matrix G . Upon observing entry a_k , only the $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_L$ entries of the k -th column of G are relevant. Since G is locally logspace constructible, each $g_{\alpha_i, k}$ can be constructed in

$O(\log n)$ space. After the stream has ended, the verifier computes $p \begin{bmatrix} y_1^{(j)} \\ \vdots \\ y_n^{(j)} \end{bmatrix}$ using

$$p \begin{bmatrix} y_1^{(j)} \\ \vdots \\ y_n^{(j)} \end{bmatrix} = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^L (1 - B_{ij}^{q-1}).$$

After the stream ends, the verification protocol proceeds in d rounds to compute $F_0 \pmod{q}$ with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{6 \log m}$. In the first round, the prover sends a polynomial $g_1(X_1)$ which is claimed to be

$$g_1(X_1) = \sum_{x_2 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{x_d \in \{0,1\}} \tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}_1(X_1, x_2, \dots, x_d), \dots, \tilde{\chi}_n(X_1, x_2, \dots, x_d)).$$

The polynomial $g_1(X_1)$ has degree $L(q-1)$ which can be described in $O(Lq \log q^\lambda)$ bits. The verifier need not store $g_1(X_1)$ but just need to compute $g_1(r_1)$, $g_1(0)$ and $g_1(1)$, which can be done in a streaming fashion. Note that if the prover is honest, then

$$F_0 \pmod{q} = g_1(0) + g_1(1). \quad (6)$$

In round $2 \leq j \leq d-1$, the verifier sends r_{j-1} to the prover who then sends the polynomial $g_j(X_j)$, which is claimed to be

$$g_j(X_j) = \sum_{x_{j+1} \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{x_d \in \{0,1\}} \tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}_1(r_1, \dots, r_{j-1}, X_j, x_{j+1}, \dots, x_d), \dots, \tilde{\chi}_n(r_1, \dots, r_{j-1}, X_j, x_{j+1}, \dots, x_d)) \quad (7)$$

The verifier computes $g_j(r_j)$, $g_j(0)$ and $g_j(1)$ and proceeds to the next round only if the degree of g_j is at most $L(q-1)$ and

$$g_{j-1}(r_{j-1}) = g_j(0) + g_j(1).$$

In the final round, the verifier sends r_{d-1} to the prover who then sends the polynomial $g_d(X_d)$, which is claimed to be

$$g_d(X_d) = \tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}_1(r_1, \dots, r_{d-1}, X_d), \dots, \tilde{\chi}_n(r_1, \dots, r_{d-1}, X_d)).$$

The verifier only accepts that (6) is computed correctly if g_d is of the correct degree, $g_{d-1}(r_{d-1}) = g_d(0) + g_d(1)$ and $g_d(r_d) = \tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}(r_1, \dots, r_d))$.

Next, we show that if the prover is dishonest, the verifier will reject the claimed value of $F_0 \pmod{q}$ with high probability.

Lemma 2. *In the case of the honest prover, the verifier will accept the wrong value of $F_0 \pmod{q}$ with probability at most $\frac{1}{6 \log m}$. If*

$$\sum_{x_1 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{x_d \in \{0,1\}} \tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}(x_1, \dots, x_d)) \quad (8)$$

correctly represents $F_0 \pmod{q}$ and if the prover cheats by sending some polynomial which does not need the requirements of the protocol, the verifier will accept with probability at most $\frac{L(q-1)d}{q^\lambda}$.

Proof. In the case of a honest prover, since the interactive protocol always evaluates (8) correctly, the prover will fail in the case that the approximating polynomial \tilde{p} does not represent the OR function. By (4), the probability that the honest prover will fail is at

most $\frac{1}{6 \log m}$.

For the case of the dishonest prover, the argument proceeds inductively from the d -th round to the first round. Indeed, if g_d is not as claimed, by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma,

$$\Pr [g_d(r_d) = \tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}(r_1, \dots, r_d))] \leq \frac{L(q-1)}{q^\lambda}.$$

By induction, suppose for $1 \leq j \leq d-1$ that the verifier is convinced that $g_{j+1}(X_{j+1})$ is correct with high probability. He can verify the correctness of $g_j(X_j)$ with high probability; since

$$g_{j+1}(X_{j+1}) = \sum_{x_{j+2} \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{x_d \in \{0,1\}} \tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}_1(r_1, \dots, r_j, X_{j+1}, x_{j+2}, \dots, x_d), \dots \\ \cdots, \tilde{\chi}_n(r_1, \dots, r_j, X_{j+1}, x_{j+2}, \dots, x_d)),$$

it is easy to see by (7) that $g_j(r_j) = g_{j+1}(0) + g_{j+1}(1)$. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma,

$$\Pr \left[\hat{g}_j(r_j) = g_{j+1}(0) + g_{j+1}(1) \quad \text{where} \right. \\ \hat{g}_j(X_j) \neq \sum_{x_{j+1} \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{x_d \in \{0,1\}} \tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}_1(r_1, \dots, r_{j-1}, X_j, x_{j+1}, \dots, x_d), \dots \\ \cdots, \tilde{\chi}_n(r_1, \dots, r_{j-1}, X_j, x_{j+1}, \dots, x_d)) \left. \right] \leq \frac{L(q-1)}{q^\lambda}.$$

For the cheating prover to succeed, he has to give

$$\hat{g}_1(X_1) \neq \sum_{x_2 \in \{0,1\}} \cdots \sum_{x_d \in \{0,1\}} \tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}_1(X_1, x_2, \dots, x_d), \dots, \tilde{\chi}_n(X_1, x_2, \dots, x_d))$$

and either that in some round $j+1$ (for some $1 \leq j \leq d-1$), when the verifier reveals r_j , it should satisfy

$$\hat{g}_j(r_j) = g_{j+1}(0) + g_{j+1}(1)$$

or $\hat{g}_d(r_d) = \tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}(r_1, \dots, r_d))$ in the final round. By the union bound,

$$\Pr [\hat{g}_1(X_1) \neq g_1(X_1) \text{ and the verifier accepts}] \leq \frac{L(q-1)d}{q^\lambda} \leq \frac{1}{6 \log m}.$$

□

Analysis of space and communication. We now analyse the space needed by the verifier and the total communication between the prover and verifier over the $\log m$ rounds to verify $F_0 \pmod{q}$. First, let us look at the space complexity of the verifier. He needs to store $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_L$ which will take $O(\log m \log n)$ bits of space. With $O(\log m \log \log m)$ bits of space, the verifier can compute $\tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}(r_1, \dots, r_d))$ when observing the stream. Note during the interaction with the prover after the stream ends, at each round $1 \leq j \leq d$, the verifier need not store the polynomial $g_j(X_j)$ but only need to evaluate g_j at a constant number of points. Hence, the space complexity of the verifier is $O(\log m [\log n + \log \log m])$ bits.

We now bound the total communication between the prover and verifier. The verifier needs to communicate $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_L$ and r_1, \dots, r_{d-1} to the prover, with cost $O(\log m \log n)$ and $O(\log m \log \log m)$ respectively. The prover, who needs to send $g_1(X_1), \dots, g_d(X_d)$, uses $O(dLq \log q^\lambda) = O(q \cdot \log^2 m \log \log m)$ bits to communicate all these polynomials. Hence, the total communication is $O(\log m (\log n + q \log m \log \log m))$ bits. We summarize our result below.

Lemma 3. *There exist an (h, v) SIP with $\log m$ rounds with*

$$\begin{aligned} h &= \log m (\log n + q \log m \log \log m), \\ v &= \log m (\log n + \log \log m) \end{aligned}$$

that computes $F_0 \pmod{q}$, where the completeness error

$$\epsilon_c = \frac{1}{6 \log m}$$

and the soundness error

$$\epsilon_s = \frac{1}{3 \log m}.$$

for any prime $q \leq 2 \log m \log \log m + 2$.

Computing F_0 exactly. Lemma 3 gives us an streaming interactive protocol to verify the correctness of $F_0 \pmod{q}$ with high probability for any prime $q \leq 2 \log m \log \log m + 2$. Now, we show how the prover can verify F_0 with high probability. Let $Q = \{q_1, \dots, q_{\log m}\}$ be the first $\log m$ primes. Note that $q_{\log m} \leq 2 \log m \log \log m + 2$ for all $m \geq 2$ [4] and

$$\prod_{i=1}^{\log m} q_i > m.$$

So, the verifier will compute $F_0 \pmod{q_i}$ for $i = 1, \dots, \log m$. Note that this can be done in parallel and will cause the working space of the verifier and the total communication to increase, but the number of rounds is still $\log m$. By using the Chinese remainder theorem, the verifier can compute F_0 exactly given $F_0 \pmod{q_i}$ for $i = 1, \dots, \log m$. By the union bound, the completeness and soundness error are $1/6$ and $1/3$ respectively.

In the preprocessing phase (even before seeing the data), the verifier and prover agree on a constant $\zeta > 0$ such that the linear code $\mathcal{C}_i := [\zeta n, n, \frac{1}{3}\zeta n]_{q_i}$ exists for all $1 \leq i \leq \log m$. Note that the same $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_L$ can be used to define the polynomial $\tilde{p}_i : \mathbf{F}_{q_i}^n \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_{q_i}^\lambda$ for each $1 \leq i \leq \log m$. For each $1 \leq i \leq \log m$, the verifier needs to choose uniformly at random $r^{(i)} \in \mathbf{F}_{q_i}^d$ and compute $\tilde{p}(\tilde{\chi}(r^{(i)}))$. This can be done in space $O(\log^2 m \log \log m)$. Hence, the total space used by the verifier is $O(\log m (\log n + \log m \log \log m))$.

To bound the total communication, we need the following fact: Let p_n be the n^{th} prime, then it is known [4] that $\sum_{i=1}^n p_i = \Theta(n^2 \log n)$ for all $n \geq 2$. Hence, the total communication is

$$O\left(\log m \log n + (\log^2 m \log \log m) \sum_{i=1}^{\log m} q_i\right) = O(\log m \log n + \log^4 m (\log \log m)^2).$$

Running time of the verifier. First, we analyse the processing time of each symbol seen in the stream. We suppose it takes unit time to add and multiply two field elements from \mathbf{F}_{q^λ} . For each symbol a_k seen, the verifier needs to compute $\widetilde{\chi}_k(r^{(q)})$ where $r^{(q)} \in \mathbf{F}_{q^\lambda}^d$ for each $q \in Q$. From (1), it is easy to see that the verifier needs $O(d) = O(\log m)$ time to compute $\widetilde{\chi}_k(r^{(q)})$ for each $q \in Q$. Hence the total time taken by the verifier to process each symbol is $O(\log^2 m)$. After this, the verifier can discard a_k and only need to update matrices B for each $q \in Q$ (See (5) for the definition of matrix B). In another workstation, the verifier can update matrices B using (5) after computing $\widetilde{\chi}_k(r^{(q)})$ for each $q \in Q$. Note that after $\widetilde{\chi}_k(r^{(q)})$ is computed, the updating of B does not require a_k anymore.

We summarize our results below.

Theorem 1. *There exist an (h, v) SIP with $\log m$ rounds with*

$$\begin{aligned} h &= \log m (\log n + \log^3 m (\log \log m)^2), \\ v &= \log m (\log n + \log m \log \log m) \end{aligned}$$

that computes F_0 exactly, where the completeness and soundness error are $1/6$ and $1/3$ respectively. The update time for the verifier per symbol received is $O(\log^2 m)$.

4 Conclusions and Open Problems

We have shown that there is a streaming interactive protocol with $\log m$ rounds to compute F_0 exactly using space and communication polylogarithmic in m and n . This improves the previous work in [11] which also gave a $\log m + 1$ protocol but the total communication of their protocol was $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$.

In this section, we assume that $m = \theta(n)$, to simplify the statement of bounds. An open problem that remains is whether we can obtain an interactive protocol with $\log m$ rounds and $\text{polylog}(m)$ space and communication for F_∞ , the number of times the most frequent item appears in the data stream. It is known that a constant approximation of F_∞ requires $\Omega(m)$ space in the standard model where there is no prover. So even approximating F_∞ with $\log m$ rounds and $\text{polylog}(m)$ complexity is interesting. Again computing F_∞ in NC and polylogarithmic rounds can be achieved. The authors of [11] describe an interactive protocol for exactly computing F_∞ with $\log m$ rounds with communication $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{m})$ and polylogarithmic space.

Another interesting theoretical problem would be to obtain non-trivial lower bounds on the Arthur-Merlin(AM) communication complexity of the Disjointness function (refer to [19] for the definition of the AM model in communication complexity). Proving any superlogarithmic lower bounds on the AM complexity of Disjointness will rule out constant round streaming interactive protocols for $F_k (k \neq 1)$ with polylogarithmic complexity.

For the online MA model, we conjecture that the protocol given in [7] for exact F_0 with complexity $O(m^{2/3} \log m)$ is tight, up to logarithmic factors. In this restricted online MA model, it might be easier to prove lower bounds larger than \sqrt{m} , as compared to proving lower bounds in the general Merlin-Arthur model. Also, in the online MA model, any protocol that approximates F_k up to a constant factor requires $hv = \Omega(m^{1-5/k})$ [7]. Since it is known that for $k \geq 3$, approximating F_k in the standard model requires $\Omega(m^\alpha)$ space for some constant $\alpha > 0$ [5], it is an interesting open problem whether approximating F_3, F_4 and F_5 is easy or hard in the online MA model.

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A F_0 protocol of [11]

We note that the protocol given in [11] assumes that $n = O(m)$. We present their protocol for completeness sake, stating the complexity results in terms of m and n .

Theorem 2. *There is a $(\sqrt{n} \log m(\log m + \log n), \log m(\log m + \log n))$ SIP with $\log m + 1$ rounds to compute F_0 .*

Following the discussion in Section 1.2, we remove the heavy hitters from the stream to reduce the degree of the polynomial. The ϕ -heavy hitter protocol described below lists all the items $i \in [m]$ such that $f_i > T := \phi n$. The verifier need not store all the heavy hitters in his memory.

Lemma 4. *There is a $(\phi^{-1} \log m(\log m + \log n), \log m(\log m + \log n))$ SIP with $\log m + 1$ rounds that identifies all the ϕ -heavy hitters in a data stream.*

Proof. Consider a binary tree \mathcal{T} of depth $\log m$ where the value of the i -th leaf is f_i . For any node $v \in V_{\mathcal{T}}$, denote $L(v)$ to be the set of leaves of the subtree rooted at v and let $p(v)$ to be the parent of v . For every node $v \in V_{\mathcal{T}}$, we denote its value by $\hat{f}(v) := \sum_{i \in L(v)} f_i$. We denote the witness set $W \subseteq V_{\mathcal{T}}$ which consists of all leaves l with $\hat{f}(l) > T$ and all nodes v which satisfy $\hat{f}(v) \leq T$ and $\hat{f}(p(v)) > T$. This witness set ensures that no heavy hitters are omitted by the prover. Label the nodes of \mathcal{T} in some canonical order from $\{1, 2, \dots, 2m - 1\}$. Let $x \in \{0, 1\}^{2m-1}$ be the indicator vector for W , i.e. $x_j = 1$ if and only if the j -th node of \mathcal{T} belongs to W . The prover gives the set W together with the claimed frequency $f^*(w)$ for each $w \in W$. If $w \notin W$, then define $f^*(w) = 0$. The verifier needs to check that the set W does cover the whole universe and that $f^*(w) = \hat{f}(w)$ for all $w \in W$. This is equivalent to checking that

$$\sum_{j=1}^{2m-1} x_j \left(f^*(j) - \hat{f}(j) \right)^2 = 0. \quad (9)$$

Running the sum-check protocol of [22] to (9) will require $\log m + 1$ rounds of interaction. We have to choose a prime $q > (2m - 1)n^2$ which will require $O(\log n + \log m)$ bits to represent q . At each level of the binary tree, there can be at most $2\phi^{-1}$ nodes that belong to W , which implies that $|W| = O(\phi^{-1} \log m)$. In each round of the sum-check protocol, the prover communicates a polynomial of degree at most 3. Hence the total communication is dominated by $O(\phi^{-1} \log^2 m + \phi^{-1} \log m \log n)$.

The verifier need to pick a random point $r \in \mathbf{F}_q^{\log m + 1}$ and needs to evaluate $\tilde{x}(r)$, $\tilde{f}^*(r)$ and $\tilde{f}(r)$, where \tilde{x} , \tilde{f}^* and \tilde{f} are the multilinear extensions of x , f^* and \hat{f} respectively. As described in [11], $\tilde{x}(r)$, $\tilde{f}^*(r)$ and $\tilde{f}(r)$ can be calculated in a single pass over the stream. Hence the space complexity of the verifier is $O(\log m(\log m + \log n))$. \square

The protocol of F_0 proceeds as follows: The verifier removes all the ϕ -heavy hitters in the stream with the help of the prover. This gives rise to a new stream $\tilde{\sigma}$ where the frequency of each element is at most ϕn . The sum check protocol [22] is then applied to

$$F_0 = \sum_{i=1}^m h(f'_i) \tag{10}$$

where f'_i is the frequency of item i in the derived stream $\tilde{\sigma}$ and $h : \mathbf{N} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is given by $h(0) = 0$ and $h(x) = 1$ for $1 \leq x \leq \phi n$. We can work over the finite field \mathbf{F}_p , where $p \geq \max\{m, n\}$. Running the sum check protocol on (10) requires $\log m$ rounds of interaction which will give a total communication of $O(\phi n(\log m + \log n) \log m)$. The space required by the verifier is $O(\log m(\log m + \log n))$. Note that the heavy hitter protocol and the sum check protocol of (10) can be carried out in parallel. By choosing $\phi = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}$, we get Theorem 2.