Abstract
We analyze the interactions between several national and international standards for smart card based applications, noting deficiencies in those standards, or at least deficiencies in the documentation of their dependencies. We show that currently smart card protocols are specified in a way that standard compliant protocol implementations may be vulnerable to attacks. We further show that attempts to upgrade security by increasing the length of cryptographic keys may fail when message formats in protocols are not re-examined at the same time.
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© 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Meier, J., Gollmann, D. (2014). Caught in the Maze of Security Standards. In: Christianson, B., Malcolm, J. (eds) Security Protocols XVIII. Security Protocols 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7061. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45921-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45921-8_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-45920-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-45921-8
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