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Models of Strategic Reasoning pp 292–317Cite as

Strategies in Social Software

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 8972))

Abstract

Viewing the way society has defined its rules and mechanisms as “social software”, we want to understand how people behave given their understanding of the societal rules and given their wish to further their interest as they conceive it, and how social mechanisms should be designed to suit people furthering their interest as they conceive it. This chapter is written from the perspective of strategic game theory, and uses strategic game scenarios and game transformations to analyze societal mechanisms.

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Acknowledgement

Johan van Benthem, Robin Clark and Rainer Kessler sent their written comments on an early draft, in which Floor Sietsma was also involved. Later, I received helpful comments from Barteld Kooi.

The final version has benefitted from extensive reports by two anonymous reviewers. Since these reports were excellent, I have tried to implement almost all referee suggestions. Inspiring conversations with Mamoru Kaneko have led to further improvements.

Thanks are also due to book editors Rineke Verbrugge and Sujata Ghosh for detailed comments on the final version and for help with proof-reading, and to the other participants in the Lorentz workshop on Modeling Strategic Reasoning for inspiring feedback. Finally, I acknowledge communication with Krzysztof Apt and Guido Schaefer.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Mathematics and Computer Science (CWI), Amsterdam and Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC), University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Jan van Eijck

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  1. Jan van Eijck
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Correspondence to Jan van Eijck .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Inst for Logic Language & Computation, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Noord-Holland, The Netherlands

    Johan van Benthem

  2. Indian Statistical Institute, Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India

    Sujata Ghosh

  3. Faculty of Math & Natural Sci, University of Groningen, Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Rineke Verbrugge

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van Eijck, J. (2015). Strategies in Social Software. In: van Benthem, J., Ghosh, S., Verbrugge, R. (eds) Models of Strategic Reasoning. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8972. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48540-8_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48540-8_9

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