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An Argument for Permissivism from Safespots

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Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 9394))

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Abstract

I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ propositions – i.e. a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on the following plausible principle: If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One motivation for denying this principle – viz. opposition to ‘epistemic consequentialism’ – is briefly discussed.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, N.T.N.U. Dragvoll, 7491, Trondheim, Norway

    Thomas Raleigh

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  1. Thomas Raleigh
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Correspondence to Thomas Raleigh .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept of Comp Sci, Univ of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom

    Wiebe van der Hoek

  2. Department of Philosophy, Group in Logic & the Methodology of Sci. University of California, Berkeley, California, USA

    Wesley H. Holliday

  3. Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang-Ming University, Taipei, Taiwan

    Wen-fang Wang

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Raleigh, T. (2015). An Argument for Permissivism from Safespots. In: van der Hoek, W., Holliday, W., Wang, Wf. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9394. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48561-3_25

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48561-3_25

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-48560-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-48561-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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