Abstract
The early detection of potential threats during the modelling and design phase of a Secure Information System is required because it favours the design of a robust access control policy and the prevention of malicious behaviours during system execution. This paper deals with internal attacks which can be made by people inside the organization. Such attacks are difficult to detect because insiders have authorized system access and also may be familiar with system policies and procedures. We are interested in finding attacks which conform to the access control policy, but lead to unwanted states. These attacks are favoured by policies involving authorization constraints, which grant or deny access depending on the evolution of the functional Information System state. In this context, we propose to model functional requirements and their Role Based Access Control (RBAC) policies using B machines and then to formally reason on both models. In order to extract insider attack scenarios from these B specifications, our approach first investigates symbolic behaviours. Then, the use of a model-checking tool allows to exhibit, from a symbolic behaviour, an observable concrete sequence of operations that can be followed by an attacker. In this paper, we show how this combination of symbolic analysis and model-checking allows to find out such insider attack scenarios.
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Acknowledgments
This work is supported by the french MESR. The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments which contributes to improve this paper.
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Radhouani, A., Idani, A., Ledru, Y., Ben Rajeb, N. (2015). Symbolic Search of Insider Attack Scenarios from a Formal Information System Modeling. In: Koutny, M., Desel, J., Haddad, S. (eds) Transactions on Petri Nets and Other Models of Concurrency X. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9410. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48650-4_7
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