Abstract
The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
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Notes
- 1.
To be precise they assumed that the correlated strategies can use a finite history.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the reviewers for useful feedback. This work was supported by the Danish National Research Foundation and The National Science Foundation of China (under the grant 61361136003) for the Sino-Danish Center for the Theory of Interactive Computation, by the Center for Research in Foundations of Electronic Markets (CFEM) supported by the Danish Strategic Research Council, and by the Czech Science Foundation (grant no. 15-23235S).
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Bošanský, B., Brânzei, S., Hansen, K.A., Miltersen, P.B., Sørensen, T.B. (2015). Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games. In: Markakis, E., Schäfer, G. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9470. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15
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