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Bottleneck Routing with Elastic Demands

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Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 9470))

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Abstract

Bottleneck routing games are a well-studied model to investigate the impact of selfish behavior in communication networks. In this model, each user selects a path in a network for routing their fixed demand. The disutility of a used only depends on the most congested link visited. We extend this model by allowing users to continuously vary the demand rate at which data is sent along the chosen path. As our main result we establish tight conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria.

M. Klimm—This research was carried out in the framework of Matheon supported by Einstein Foundation Berlin.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We defer this counterexample to the full version of this paper.

  2. 2.

    Technically, they do not satisfy Assumption 3 since their domain is only a subinterval of the non-negative reals. This, however, is not an issue as the functions diverge to \(\infty \) as they approach the right boundary of their domain, so that no player has an incentive to raise its demand in a way that the load on a resource exceeds the domain of its cost function.

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Acknowledgements

Some of the proof techniques used in this paper appeared in the diploma thesis of the third author. We wish to thank three anonymous referees who found several (nontrivial) typos and suggested several improvements and new related references.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Mathematics, University of Augsburg, 86135, Augsburg, Germany

    Tobias Harks

  2. Department of Mathematics, Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Max Klimm & Manuel Schneider

Authors
  1. Tobias Harks
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  2. Max Klimm
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  3. Manuel Schneider
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Correspondence to Max Klimm .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece

    Evangelos Markakis

  2. CWI and VU Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Guido Schäfer

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Harks, T., Klimm, M., Schneider, M. (2015). Bottleneck Routing with Elastic Demands. In: Markakis, E., Schäfer, G. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9470. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_28

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_28

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