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Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII pp 111–127Cite as

Holdout Threats During Wage Bargaining

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((TCCI,volume 9760))

Abstract

We investigate a wage bargaining between a union and a firm where the parties’ preferences are expressed by varying discount rates and the threat of the union is to be on go-slow instead of striking. First, we describe the attitude of the union as hostile or altruistic where a hostile union is on go-slow in every disagreement period and an altruistic union never threatens the firm and holds out in every disagreement period. Then we derive subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining when the union’s attitude is determined exogenously. Furthermore, we determine necessary conditions for the equilibrium extreme payoffs of both parties independently of the union’s attitude and calculate the extreme payoffs for a particular case when the firm is at least as patient as the union.

Agnieszka Rusinowska acknowledges the support by the National Agency for Research (Agence Nationale de la Recherche), Project ANR-14-CE24-0007-01 “CoCoRICo-CoDec”.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that for \(\lambda =1\) we recover the case of the altruistic union.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Turgut Ozal University, Ayvali Mh. 158. Cd., Etlik Kecioren/Ankara, Turkey

    Ahmet Ozkardas

  2. Paris School of Economics - CNRS, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75647, Paris, France

    Agnieszka Rusinowska

Authors
  1. Ahmet Ozkardas
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  2. Agnieszka Rusinowska
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Correspondence to Agnieszka Rusinowska .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Wrocław University of Technology, Wrocław, Poland

    Ngoc Thanh Nguyen

  2. Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorn, Australia

    Ryszard Kowalczyk

  3. WSB University in Wroclaw, Wroclaw, Poland

    Jacek Mercik

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Ozkardas, A., Rusinowska, A. (2016). Holdout Threats During Wage Bargaining. In: Nguyen, N., Kowalczyk, R., Mercik, J. (eds) Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9760. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_7

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-52885-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-52886-0

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