Skip to main content

Multi-Agent Classifier Systems and the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

  • Conference paper
Artificial Neural Nets and Genetic Algorithms

Abstract

This paper describes experiments using multiple classifier system (CS) agents to play the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) under various conditions. Our main interest is in how, and under what circumstances, co-operation is most likely to emerge through competition between these agents. Experiments are conducted with agents playing fixed strategies and other agents individually and in tournaments, with differing CS parameters. Performance improves when reward is stored and averaged over longer periods, and when a genetic algorithm (GA) is used more frequently. Increasing the memory of the system improves performance to a point, but long memories proved difficult to reinforce fully and performed less well.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. R. Axelrod. Effective choice in the prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24:3–25, 1980.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. R. Axelrod. More effective choice in the prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24:379–403, 1980.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. R. Axelrod. The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. In L. Davis, editor, Genetic Algorithms and Simulated Annealing, pages 32–41. Morgan Kaufmann, 1987.

    Google Scholar 

  4. J. Bendor, R.M. Kramer, and S. Stout. When in doubt: Cooperation in a noisy prisoner’s dilema. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35(4), 1991.

    Google Scholar 

  5. K.G. Binmore and L. Samuelson. Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata. Journal of Economic Theory, 57, 1992.

    Google Scholar 

  6. A. Carbonaro, G. Casadei, and A. Palareti. Genetic algorithms and classifier systems in simulating co-operative behaviour. In R.F. Albrecht and C.R. Reeves, C.R. Steele, editors, Artificial Neural Networks and Genetic Algorithms, pages 479–483. Springer-Verlag, Wien New York, 1993.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. P.H. Crowley. Evolving cooperation: Strategies as hierachies of rules. BioSystems, 37:67–80, 1996.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. G. Ellison. Learning, local interaction, and coordination. Econometra, 61(5), 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  9. A. Fairley and D.F. Yates. Improving simple classifier systems to alleviate the problems of duplication, subsumsion and equivalence of rules. In R.F. Albrecht, C.R Reeves, and N.C. Steele, editors, Artificial Neural Nets and Genetic Algorithms. Springer/Verlag, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  10. D.B. Fogel. On the relationship between the duration of an encounter and the evolution of cooperation in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Evolutionary Computation, 3(3):349–363, 1996.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. J.R. Hoffmann and N.C. Waring. The localisation of learning and interaction in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Draft Copy, University of East Anglia, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  12. J.H. Holland. Processing and processors for scemata. In Jacks E.L., editor, Associative Information Processing, pages 127–146. American Elsevier, New York, 1971.

    Google Scholar 

  13. J.H. Holland. Properties of the bucket brigade algorithm. In Grefenstette J.J., editor, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Genetic Algorithms and Applications. Morgan Kaufmann, 1985.

    Google Scholar 

  14. J.H. Holland. The effect of labels (tags) on social interactions. Santa Fe Institute Discusion Paper 93-10-064, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  15. O. Kirchamp. Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. PhD thesis, 1995.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Y. Mor, C.V. Goldman, and J.S. Rosenschein. Learn your opponents strategy (in polynomial time)! In: Adaptation and Learning in Multi-Agent Systems, (G. Weiss and S. Sen), pages 164–176, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  17. J.F. Nash. Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 54:286–295, 1951.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  18. W. Poundstone. Prisoner’s Dilemma. Oxford University Press, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  19. B.R. Routledge. Co-evolution and Spatial Interaction. PhD thesis, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  20. A. Rubinstein. Finite automata in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 1986.

    Google Scholar 

  21. T.W. Sandholm and R.H. Crites. On multi-agent q-learning in a semi-competetive domain. In G. Weiss and S. Sen, editors, Adaptation and Learning in Multi-Agent Systems, pages 191–205. 1996.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1998 Springer-Verlag Wien

About this paper

Cite this paper

Chalk, K., Smith, G.D. (1998). Multi-Agent Classifier Systems and the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In: Artificial Neural Nets and Genetic Algorithms. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-6492-1_136

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-6492-1_136

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Vienna

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-211-83087-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-7091-6492-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics