IT Security Management

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Alberto Partida · Diego Andina

IT Security Management

IT Securiteers - Setting up an IT Security Function



Alberto Partida Information Security Expert GIAC, CEH, CISSP, CISA, CGEIT, MBA Technical University of Madrid Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM) Spain apartidar@gmail.com securityandrisk.blogspot.com Diego Andina Grupo de Automatización en Señal y Comunicaciones Technical University of Madrid Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM) Spain andina@gc.ssr.upm.es

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There are costs and risks to a program of action, but they are far less than the long-range risks and costs of comfortable inaction.

John F. Kennedy, 1961–1963

...the only asset that is undervalued these days in world economy is risk... Robert Rubin, 2006

Information security is based on outsmarting the other (the dark ;-) side Alberto Partida, 2008

Acknowledgments

To:

My best half and my beloved editor, Raquel

My mentors in life, my parents, my brother

My mentors in my study life, Diego and Jean-Nöel

My mentors in my working life, Santiago, Carlos, Luis, Fernando, Jan and Dominique

My team colleagues at work

My friends

About the Authors

Alberto Partida is a M.Sc. graduate in telecommunication engineering by Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM), specialised in computer science and IT security. He started in IT security in 1996 as a student preparing his dissertation in the group for Automation in Signals and Communications at UPM, led by Diego Andina. Since 1998, his professional experience covers network, system, application and business process security. Alberto currently provides his expertise to international organisations, coordinating a team of IT and Security experts focused on an IT risk reduction approach within the technology and organisational realm. He also teaches IT and IT security to pre-graduates in a French University. Alberto is a member of the SANS GIAC Advisory Board. He holds CEH, CISA, CISSP, CGEIT, Gold GSEC, Gold GCFW, Gold GCFA, GCIA and GREM GIAC certifications and he has finished his MBA at Henley Business School, ranked in the world's top 15 schools by The Economist MBA ranking. Alberto can be contacted through his blog at securityandrisk.blogspot.com.

Professor Diego Andina was born in Madrid, Spain, received simultaneously two master degrees, on computer science and on communications by the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (Technical University of Madrid, UPM), Spain, in 1990, and the Ph.D. degree in 1995. He works for UPM where he heads the Group for Automation in Signals and Communications (GASC/UPM). He is author or co-author of more than 200 national and international publications, being director of more than 50 R&D projects financed by National Government, European Commission or private institutions and firms. He is also an associate editorial member of several international journals and transactions and has participated in the organization of more than 50 international events. Diego is co-author of the book "Computational Intelligence for Engineering and Manufacturing" (2007) published by Springer. He is a computational intelligence researcher and an educational innovation expert. In the past, he has worked as a consultant at Andersen Consulting and he was a lieutenant in charge of the Security Office at the Spanish Air Force.

Foreword

In 1862, the gardener James Bateman sent several specimens of the Christmas orchid to Charles Darwin. This orchid was first planted in Britain in 1855 and it did not blossom until 1857. It had been discovered several decades before by the French botanist Louis-Marie Aubert du Petit-Thouars in Madagascar in 1822. The most significant aspect of this flower is the length of its spur. It measures 20–35 cm from the tip to the lip of the flower.

In 1862, Charles Darwin published his book titled "Fertilization of Orchids", where he predicted that there should be a moth with a proboscis of a similar size. Darwin knew that the Christmas orchid should be pollinated by a moth with a proboscis that could get to the bottom of the flower given that the nectar is stored in the lower 5 cm of its tubular spur. There should be a moth with a proboscis of a similar length, able to reach the nectar from the outside of the flower.

At that time, the reaction in the scientific community was not welcoming. Darwin had to endure some teasing. No one had ever discovered a moth with a two-handspan proboscis.

The moth that pollinates the Christmas orchid was discovered later on in Madagascar in 1903 and it had, indeed, a 25–30 cm long proboscis. It was baptised with the name of "*Xanthopan morganii praedicta*". The qualifier "praedicta" refers to the prediction made by Darwin. We had to wait for the arrival of the 21st century for it to be filmed in action for the first time.

How could Darwin be sure of the existence of that moth? Would it not be possible that another type of insect was responsible for this orchid's pollination? For Darwin, the reasoning was simple. Tubular flowers of pale or white colours that open at night belong to the floral syndrome called *sphinxophilia*. Such flowers are usually pollinated by *sphinginae* (sphinx moths). These moths have a very long proboscis and obtain nectar while in flight over the flower, similar to what hummingbirds do. That is, sphinxophilias are pollinated by sphinginae. If a sphinxophilia has a 35 cm long spur and the nectar is located in its lower 5 cm, there must be a sphinginae with a 30 cm long proboscis. Simple. Forty-one years passed by until that sphinx moth was discovered and 140 years until it was filmed.

More striking than no one else having this idea before is the fact that scientists contemporary to Darwin did not believe him. Darwin predicted shockingly the existence of an animal, unknown until then, by simply using the logic of the evolution of species.

Daniel Hunt Janzen states for the first time in 1980 his "theory of co-evolution". According to it, evolutionary changes that occur in a species are the answer to the selection process that another species makes, whose result transforms into a process of mutual adaptation with the first species. Each one makes the other evolve. This concept can be applied to symbiotic and parasitic relationships, pollination and to the relationship between hunter and prey.

The Christmas orchid and its moth have become one of the most used examples of co-evolution. Let's go back in time and think of the early days of the relationship between the flower and the moth, when co-evolution began to take shape.

The spur of the flower measured 10 cm and moths' proboscis reached 5 cm. Moths with a 5.1 cm long proboscis had more chances to survive because they could access food that individuals with a 4.9 cm long proboscis did not reach. Furthermore, moths with a 5.1 cm long proboscis specialised in taking the nectar of orchids with a 10.1 cm long spur and exchanged pollen with specimens having a just over 10 cm long spur, since there were more competitors fighting to land on flowers with a just under 10 cm long spur. This situation promoted the genetic exchange between moths with large proboscis, making each new generation grow in length. You can imagine the rest of the story. Thousands of years later, Darwin managed to predict the existence of the moth by looking only at the flower, and 118 years later Janzen came to explain his theory of co-evolution.

Alberto and Diego have captured in this book some ideas derived from coevolution applied to the organization of Security in Information Systems.

The application of co-evolution is of interest to us, obviously, not the one that occurs between a flower and a moth, but the one happening among people. We apply the principles of co-evolution to four organisational aspects:

- The first point focuses on the relative speed at which evolution must occur. Leigh Van Valen developed a principle within the co-evolution theory known as the "Red Queen hypothesis", referring to the Red Queen that appears in Lewis Carroll's book "Alice in Wonderland", who states that "you cannot stop running to continue in the same place". From the co-evolution viewpoint, this principle is often expressed as "for an evolutionary system, continuous improvement is necessary, at least, to maintain adjustment with respect to the systems with which it is co-evolving". We must transform and evolve at the speed of change of our ecosystem. Not slower or faster.
- The second aspect has to do with what we provide to the process of co-evolution, and what we obtain from it. If we wish for a Christmas orchid to blossom, a fundamental step is to find a moth with a 30 cm long proboscis. If we, as IT security executives, need to patch systems ad-hoc in less than 12 h, the key is not to confront IT operations colleagues with an order. A smarter way may be to achieve a specific budget so that a technical unit can always perform that patching job on demand when required. If we wish for Christmas orchids to blossom, a fundamental step is to find moths with a 30 cm long proboscis.

- The third organisational topic deals with the realistic speed at which we can perform the process of co-evolution. We will start with moths with 5 cm long proboscis. Although the goal is to reach moths with 30 cm long proboscis, the first step will be to strive for a 5.1 cm long proboscis. Transformation in cultural and organisational processes needs to occur gradually and steadily. If we aim to perform a process that currently takes 1 week in just 1 h, a first real success will be to run it in less than 48 h. Only then we will be able to start thinking of reducing the time required for it to less than 6 h. The fundamental tenet is to improve and to start moving towards the target. Most of the times, we will only know the speed we can attain once we have started our journey.
- The fourth and final aspect upon co-evolution refers to the mandate of IT security officers to provide security enhancements to the organisation. This is their contribution to the co-evolution process. However, it is not exclusive to them. If IT security executives fail in fulfilling their mandate, other players will do it for the mere survival of the business.

These foundational recommendations, not only to Information Systems Security, but to any human organization, can be summarised in the following sentences:

- We need to change at the same speed and in sync with our ecosystem. If our environment is re-organised, we should re-organise in the same direction and with the same intensity.
- We should work to reach objectives and not worry about who owns the means to achieve them.
- Determination, patience and perseverance. Every day, we must make our human environment one step closer to achieving the objective.
- We must be the shift lever in our area of expertise, otherwise leadership will naturally disappear.

Santiago Moral Chief Information Security Officer at BBVA Bank BBVA Bank ranks in listings such as Fortune 500, S&P 500, and Dow Jones

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Audience of This Book

Any fluent English reader can read this book and probably they will find useful tips even if they are far away from practising IT security but close to creating or coordinating a team. Nevertheless, the authors target three clusters of readers:

- IT security professionals, especially those recently entrusted with the daunting task of creating an IT security function, and a team, within an organisation or as an independent entity providing services to different customers.¹
- Chief Officers in organisations considering, making or supporting the decision to create an IT security team.
- IT and IT security pre-graduates or graduates with the intention to take part in the challenging experience of working in IT security.

¹Although we mostly consider in the book the case of a team within an organisation, teams located in firms that provide managed security services to customer organisations can also benefit from this book.

IT Securiteers – Setting up an IT Security Team

The Human and Technical Dimension Working for the Organisation

Current corporate governance regulations and international standards lead many organisations, big and small, to the creation of an information technology (IT) security function in their organisational chart or to the acquisition of services from the IT security industry.

More often than desired, these teams are only useful for companies' executives to tick the corresponding box in a certification process, be it ISO, ITIL, PCI, etc. Many IT security teams do not provide business value to their company. They fail to really protect the organisation from the increasing number of threats targeting its information systems.

This book provides an insight into how to create and grow a team of passionate IT Security professionals. We will call them "securiteers".¹ They will add value to the business, improving the information security stance of organisations.

Chapters Overview

This book is broken down into the following chapters:

1. Vulnerabilities, Threats and Risks in IT

First, we define and explain what are vulnerabilities, threats and risks using industry standards. Contrary to the initial belief, these concepts are not well and broadly understood and not applied in IT security systematically. Second, we propose an approach to provide IT security that brings value to the business based on the organisation's IT risk appetite.

¹More about the term "securiteers" on Section 2.7.

2. Security and IT Background

The demand of IT security experts is high. This means that not all team members will have an IT security background. Probably some of them will come from other fields, inside or outside IT. Team leaders need to make a strength out of this initial weakness. We highlight how security teams benefit from enrolling developers, script-authors and attentive-to-detail individuals with a drive for achievement. IT security is a relatively new vocation. We also provide input about what and where to study, both in the technical hands-on and the theoretical analytical dimensions.

3. The Team–Individual Contract

Motivation is an inner driving force. Motivating team members is a pre-requisite for the performance of the team. Some elements need to be present but they will not create additional motivation, these are the hygienic factors. On the contrary, motivating factors, also known as motivators, are not always present. When they are, they are different for each team member. Every individual has three dimensions (spiritual, social, professional), which need to be in balance. The team will require everyone's skills and sometimes passion. How to achieve something that cannot be imposed? The key is in the team leader. We propose leaders to let people leave and create a daily scenario that is appealing to work and to grow professionally for current and new team members.

4. What to Do: The IT Security Roadmap

What to do day by day? IT security experts tend to become firemen. This is a reality they need to avoid. "IT securiteers" should base their activities on proven security principles. A threat and a vulnerability analysis will help the team to prioritise their activities. Our proposal is to package security activities as services. A to-do list will call for the creation of specialised mini-teams within the team. Finally, we also refer to some activities an IT security team should not embark on.

5. How to Do It: Organise the Work in "Baby Steps"

How can the team organise the IT security work? We propose the concept of performing "small baby steps" that follow the "underpromise and overdeliver" premise. We perform an analysis of the threats that can affect the team and we recommend planning some "unplanned time" and to avoid individual multitasking. We continue with proposals on how to assign activities, stressing the importance of quality assurance and deadlines. Later on, we suggest how to track and report activities together with how to communicate the team's activities based on a stakeholder analysis.

6. Team Dynamics: Building a "Human System"

Every activity starts with an emotion. We first describe the traits of the IT security profession and we present the main role that the "team board" will play building a "human-based protection system" for the organisation. We then proceed to discuss typical interaction patterns occurring within the team, e.g. how technical and non-technical colleagues interact. We present useful tips to sustain the "human system" in the team and, finally, we conclude with our view on training and appraisal methods.

7. Viral Marketing

How can customers become the implementation engine of IT security services? In this chapter we justify why and how the team need to sell their products, which are mainly services. We base our proposal on the stakeholder analysis we performed in Chapter 5. We provide some communication principles and we link them with marketing elements as the "extended marketing mix" for IT security. We position the team ready to shift from traditional security awareness campaigns to a more comprehensive viral marketing activity. Even the incident response team could perform punctually some guerrilla marketing. We finalise the chapter with an introduction to the "security stories" the team need to sell and with some observations on human psychology that they need to consider in their security actions to increase success rates.

8. Management Support: An Indispensable Ingredient

Management support needs to be present in the air that any IT security team breathe. However, this air is difficult to find and to keep. In this chapter, we propose that IT security help executives achieving innovations related to risk management. We justify why management support and sponsorship is so crucial for risk management using current risk-related literature. We proceed with an enumeration of existing risk sources and risk types and we include an introduction to operational risk and enterprise risk management. Afterwards, we propose a basic model, "the risk house model" to understand how risks affect organisations and the role of committed management. Finally, we suggest a decalogue for IT security professionals and managers to work in harmony.

9. Social Networking for IT Security Professionals

Networking is a fundamental element for any IT security professional: It opens the door to tendencies, to understand society and to prepare for future professional changes. It requires time and effort but it has the potential to create value for all parties involved. IT security professionals should network both inside and outside the organisation where they provide their services. In this chapter, we present elements of the IT security community such as the most relevant fora and conferences. We also suggest ways to network with academia, physical security colleagues, law enforcement agents and local communities. Finally, we deal with the concept of the personal IT security brand, an asset that the IT security professional needs to actively look after and to grow. They need to provide value to the IT security community and to the market so that they can enjoy a future-proof career.

10. Present, Future and Beauty of IT Security

Digital infrastructures constitute already a relevant strategic and economic asset. States start to launch technical and legal measures to protect them. The digital world is also highly attractive for fraudsters, since the profit to risk ratio (PRR) is high. We highlight a new and promising market for IT security professionals: The introduction of IT security in small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Subsequently, we mention technical and social trends that will be key for IT security in the coming decade (the emergence of complexity, reputation scores, the death of privacy, the role of IT systems in critical infrastructures, the paradigm change from "an onion" to an "onion ring", virtualisation, security in "the cloud", mobile security, micro risk management, the threat of compliance, the potential application to IT security of neuroscience studies and creativity in the technical IT security arena). The journey will not be easy but it will be an exciting lifetime experience.

All chapters incorporate a final section titled "Link to MBA Management Models". In that section, we provide leads to models that have deserved careful attention in MBA syllabus. They are powerful instruments that can help the reader to manage complexity in IT security.

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