Abstract
The target of this paper is twofold. The first part develops firstly a very general and abstract topic, by describing what philosophy of logic is, when it is embedded in a genuine philosophical system, and it secondly provides an explanation of the reason why intuitionism, assumed as genuine philosophical system, is in total harmony with the contemporary intuitionistic formal logic. This part ends on the definition of what is a stable philosophical system, and explains why Platonism and Intuitionism are stable. The second part deals with the contemporary critics against Intuitionism made by a logico-philosophical tentative to give a new rise of Stric Finitism in philosophy of logic. I give arguments to show that, at the moment, the Radical Semantic Anti-realism does not provide a philosophical system as stable as Intuitionism.
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- 1.
See [169, p. 286].
- 2.
[17, p. 166].
- 3.
See [17, p. 113]:
Consequently, as applied to ontology, axiomatics inevitably produces pluralism and disagreement. Indeed, philosophical reason is born and lives in contest.
- 4.
- 5.
[17, p. 125].
- 6.
See for example [1].
- 7.
See for example the work of Tennant [13]. I put aside here technical points around his Intuitionistic Relevant Logic, which is the right logic, according to him.
- 8.
- 9.
[13, p. 306].
- 10.
[17, p. 133].
- 11.
[13, p. 307].
- 12.
See, for example, Spinoza, Ethics, II,prop. XVIII, scol.; prop. XL, scol. I.
- 13.
Mutatis mutandis, one finds an analogous argument in history of politics, when communists argued that socialist reformists did not go further enough.
- 14.
[6].
- 15.
Marion in [8, p. 423].
- 16.
See [7].
- 17.
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Acknowledgements
Many thanks to the editors of this volume for their encouragement to publish this paper. I am especially thankful to Mathieu Marion for having revised my English.
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Vidal-Rosset, J. (2012). Stable Philosophical Systems and Radical Anti-realism. In: Rahman, S., Primiero, G., Marion, M. (eds) The Realism-Antirealism Debate in the Age of Alternative Logics. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1923-1_17
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