Abstract
First-come-first-serve (FCFS) scheme is used for selling the tickets in ticket market that is a multi-million dollar industry for any popular event. But in a competitive environment is this FCFS efficient? In earlier literature it has been shown that the auction based alternative solutions using the framework of mechanism design, a sub field of game theory, can provide better results against FCFS in terms of profit making and efficiency in allocation. However the solution proposed in the earlier literature can address the ticket selling environment where an agent can give demand for a single ticket in static environment. In many situations a single agent can give demand for multiple tickets in static environment. In this paper, with the use of mechanism design framework some elegant solutions are proposed in static environment where an agent can give demand for multiple tickets.
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Mukhopadhyay, S., Ghosh, D., Debnath, N.C., RamTeja, N. (2013). Auction Based Ticket Selling Schemes with Multiple Demand from the Agents in Static Environment. In: Park, J., Barolli, L., Xhafa, F., Jeong, HY. (eds) Information Technology Convergence. Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, vol 253. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6996-0_55
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6996-0_55
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