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Mathematical Modelling for Next-Generation Cryptography pp 315–330Cite as

How to Strengthen the Security of Signature Schemes in the Leakage Models: A Survey

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Part of the book series: Mathematics for Industry ((MFI,volume 29))

Abstract

We give a survey on generic transformations that strengthen the security of signature schemes, which are exploited in most cryptographic protocols, in the leakage models. In ProvSec 2014, Wang and Tanaka proposed a transformation which converts weakly existentially unforgeable signature schemes into strongly existentially unforgeable ones in the bounded leakage model. To obtain the construction, they combined a leakage resilient chameleon hash function with the Generalized Boneh–Shen–Waters (GBSW) transformation proposed by Steinfeld, Pieprzyk, and Wang. In ACISP 2015, Wang and Tanaka proposed another transformation in the continual leakage model. To achieve the goal, they defined a continuous leakage resilient (CLR) chameleon hash function and constructed it based on the CLR signature scheme proposed by Malkin, Teranishi, Vahlis, and Yung. Then they improved the GBSW transformation by making use of the Groth–Sahai proof system and then combine it with CLR chameleon hash functions. In Security and Communication Networks, Wang and Tanaka additionally gave an instantiation of (restricted) fully leakage resilient strong one-time signature based on leakage resilient chameleon hash functions, following the construction of strong one-time signature by Mohassel. They also proved that by combining a (restricted) fully leakage resilient strong one-time signature scheme with the transformation proposed by Huang, Wong, and Zhao, another transformation that can strengthen the security of fully leakage resilient signature schemes without changing signing keys can be obtained.

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Acknowledgements

The first author is supported by a JSPS Fellowship for Young Scientists and JSPS KAKENHI 16J10697. The second is supported by Input Output Hong Kong, I-System, Nomura Research Institute, NTT Secure Platform Laboratories and JSPS KAKENHI 16H01705.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematical and Computing Sciences, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, 152-8552, Japan

    Yuyu Wang & Keisuke Tanaka

  2. National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), Tokyo, 135-0064, Japan

    Yuyu Wang

Authors
  1. Yuyu Wang
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  2. Keisuke Tanaka
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Correspondence to Yuyu Wang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Tsuyoshi Takagi

  2. Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Masato Wakayama

  3. Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan

    Keisuke Tanaka

  4. The University of Tokyo, Kashiwa, Japan

    Noboru Kunihiro

  5. University of the Ryukyus, Nakagami-gun, Japan

    Kazufumi Kimoto

  6. Institute of Mathematics for Industry, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Dung Hoang Duong

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Wang, Y., Tanaka, K. (2018). How to Strengthen the Security of Signature Schemes in the Leakage Models: A Survey. In: Takagi, T., Wakayama, M., Tanaka, K., Kunihiro, N., Kimoto, K., Duong, D. (eds) Mathematical Modelling for Next-Generation Cryptography. Mathematics for Industry, vol 29. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5065-7_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5065-7_17

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  • Online ISBN: 978-981-10-5065-7

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