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Secure ATM Device Design by Control Command Verification

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Applications and Techniques in Information Security (ATIS 2019)

Abstract

Recently, criminals frequently utilize logical attacks to Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) and financial institutes’ networks to steal cash. An ATM security measure called “Control Command Verification” has been proposed to cope with the issues. The measure utilizes peripheral devices to prevent logical attacks “unauthorized cash withdrawals” for smart card transactions. When this measure is applied to magnetic stripe card transactions, there are a variety of implementable systems because of less implementation constraints resulted from the existing security standards for magnetic stripe card transactions. Properly implementable systems should be selected from these systems in terms of three viewpoints: preventing a wide range of logical attacks in a transaction, harmonizing with existing ATM operations, and minimizing the number of peripheral devices to be modified. This paper proposes a systematic implementation design method of the measure to satisfy those three viewpoints. Three proper systems out of the 135 implementable systems can be selected by applying the design method to magnetic stripe card transactions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    EMV is a registered trademark in the U.S. and other countries and an unregistered trademark elsewhere. The EMV trademark is owned by EMVCo, LLC.

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Correspondence to Hisao Ogata .

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Ogata, H., Ishikawa, T., Miyamoto, N., Matsumoto, T. (2019). Secure ATM Device Design by Control Command Verification. In: Shankar Sriram, V., Subramaniyaswamy, V., Sasikaladevi, N., Zhang, L., Batten, L., Li, G. (eds) Applications and Techniques in Information Security. ATIS 2019. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1116. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0871-4_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0871-4_3

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-15-0870-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-15-0871-4

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