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Analysis Toward RLWE-Based Key Exchange Protocol Based on Automatic Learning Structure

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Security and Privacy in Digital Economy (SPDE 2020)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 1268))

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Abstract

We analyzed one of the NIST post-quantum cryptography candidates: NewHope-Key-Exchange, the post-quantum key exchange protocol, using an automatic analysis strategy to attack the security properties of the scheme. Our analysis approach mainly concentrates on the Number Theory Transform (NTT) as well as the RLWE assumption applied in NewHope. The influences of security and efficiency toward NewHope are analyzed based on specially designed attack models applying an automatic analysis oracle. Under the assumption of full security indistinguishability model and partial leakage security indistinguishability model, we configure the key exchange protocol respectively, and evaluate different security strength and efficiency in different scenarios to validate the influences of NTT structure. The quantitative results show that the NTT process performs an signaficent role in the key exchange protocol.

Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61572521,U1636114), National Key Project of Research and Development Plan (2017YFB0802000), Innovative Research Team Project of Engineering University of APF (KYTD201805),Fundamental Research Project of Engineering University of APF (WJY201910).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Cryptography Engineering, Engineering University of People’s Armed Police, Xi’an, 710086, China

    Shuaishuai Zhu & Yiliang Han

  2. Key Laboratory of Network and Information Security under the People’s Armed Police, Xi’an, 710086, China

    Yiliang Han

Authors
  1. Shuaishuai Zhu
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  2. Yiliang Han
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Correspondence to Shuaishuai Zhu .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

    Shui Yu

  2. IBM Zurich Research Laboratory, Zurich, Switzerland

    Peter Mueller

  3. Ningbo University, Ningbo, China

    Jiangbo Qian

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Zhu, S., Han, Y. (2020). Analysis Toward RLWE-Based Key Exchange Protocol Based on Automatic Learning Structure. In: Yu, S., Mueller, P., Qian, J. (eds) Security and Privacy in Digital Economy. SPDE 2020. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1268. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9129-7_43

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9129-7_43

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-15-9128-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-15-9129-7

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