Abstract
The authentication function of the mobile network is the foundation to ensure the legitimacy of the network and user identities and provide security services. The authentication function of the network is realized by the network authentication protocol. Authentication protocol’s safety directly affects the communication security of the network and users. Protocol Combination Logic PCL is an formal method to make a description of protocol state transition together with algorithm in concurrent and distributed networks, which can be used to prove the security of network protocols. This paper studies the authentication mechanism of the 5G network authentication protocol 5G-AKA, and conducts formal analysis and security certification of the 5G-AKA protocol through Protocol Combination Logic (PCL). We arrive at the conclusion that the protocol has the function of mutual authentication property guarantee among entities participated Home Net HN and User Equipment UE . Protocol Combination Logic PCL can be applied to the formal analysis of similar mobile network protocols.
Supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61962020.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Reference
GSMA Global Mobile Trends 2017. https://www.gsma.com/globalmobiletrends/. Accessed 6 May 2018
Kobeissi, N., Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B.: Automated verification for secure messaging protocols and their implementations: A symbolic and computational approach. In: Automated Verification for Secure Messaging Protocols and their Implementations: A Symbolic and Computational Approach. IEEE (2017)
Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., Kobeissi, N.: Verified models and reference implementations for the TLS 1.3 standard candidate. In: 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE (2017)
Cremers, C., Horvat, M., Hoyland, J., et al.: A comprehensive symbolic analysis of TLS 1.3. In: ACM SIGSAC Conference, pp. 1773–1788. ACM (2017)
Cremers, C., Horvat, M., Scott, S., et al.: Automated analysis and verification of TLS 1.3: 0-RTT, resumption and delayed authentication. In: EEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE (2016)
David, B., Cas, C., Simon, M.: Provably repairing the ISO/IEC 9798 standard for entity authentication. J. Comput. Secur. 21(6), 817–846 (2013)
Wang, J., Zhan, N.J., Feng, X.Y., Liu, Z.M.: Overview of formal methods. J. Softw. 1(30), 33–61 (2019)
Datta, A., Derek, A., Mitchell, J., et al.: A derivation system for security protocols and its logical formalization. In: Proceedings of 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 109–125. IEEE (2003)
Li, X., Zhang, X.: Formal verification for EAP-AKA protocol in 3G networks. In: 2009 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Software Engineering. IEEE (2009)
Boyd, C., Mao, W.: On a limitation of BAN logic. In: Helleseth, T. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1993. LNCS, vol. 765, pp. 240–247. Springer, Heidelberg (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48285-7_20
Arapinis, M., Mancini, L., Ritter, E., Ryan, M.: New privacy issues in mobile telephony: fix and verification. In: Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 205–216. ACM, New York (2012)
Borgaonkar, R., Hirschi, L., Park, S., Shaik, A.: New privacy threat on 3G, 4G, and upcoming 5G AKA protocols. Proc. Priv. Enhanc. Technol. 2019(3), 108–127 (2019)
Hahn, C., Kwon, H., Kim, D., Kang, K., Hur, J.: A privacy threat in 4th generation mobile telephony and its countermeasure. In: Cai, Z., Wang, C., Cheng, S., Wang, H., Gao, H. (eds.) WASA 2014. LNCS, vol. 8491, pp. 624–635. Springer, Cham (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07782-6_56
Hu, X., Liu, C., Liu, S., You, W., Zhao, Y.: A Systematic analysis method for 5G non-access stratum signalling security. IEEE Access pp(99), 125424–125441 (2019)
TS 33.501: Security architecture and procedures for 5G system. https://www.tech-invite.com/3m33/tinv-3gpp-33-501.htmls. Accessed 2 Aug 2020
Basin, D., Dreier, J., Hirschi, L., Radomirovic, S., Sasse, R., Stettler, V.: A formal analysis of 5G authentication. In: Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 1383–1396. ACM, Toronto (2018)
Datta, A., Roy, A., Mitchell, J., et al.: Protocol composition logic (PCL). Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 172(1), 311–358 (2007)
Datta, A., Derek, A., Mitchell, J. et al.: Secure protocol composition. In: Proceedings of the 2003 ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering, pp. 11–23. ACM (2003)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this paper
Cite this paper
Zhang, T., Xiao, M., Ouyang, R. (2021). Proving Mutual Authentication Property of 5G-AKA Protocol Based on PCL. In: Cai, Z., Li, J., Zhang, J. (eds) Theoretical Computer Science. NCTCS 2021. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1494. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7443-3_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7443-3_13
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-16-7442-6
Online ISBN: 978-981-16-7443-3
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)
