Abstract
User modeling research can benefit from formal automated reasoning tools. However existing formal tools may need to be modified to suit the needs of user modeling. Theorist is a simple framework for default reasoning. It can be used as a tool for building and maintaining a user model, and as a model of a user's default reasoning. To apply Theorist to both tasks, we develop Nested Theorist (NT), a simple tool based on Theorist that allows default reasoning on arbitrarily-many levels. We extend NT in two ways: we allow prioritized defaults, and we allow reasoning about agents with limited reasoning capabilities. This paper focusses on applications, and uses wide-ranging examples from user-modeling literature to illustrate the usefulness of the tools presented.
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Van Arragon, P. Modeling default reasoning using defaults. User Model User-Adap Inter 1, 259–288 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00141082
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00141082