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An objection to possible-world semantics for counterfactual logics

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References

  1. Kit, Fine, Critical notice of Lewis, D., Counterfactuals, Mind 84 (1975) 451–8.

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  2. Christopher S.Hill and Lewis G.Creary, review of Lewis, D., Counterfactuals, Philosophy of Science 42 (1975) 351–4.

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  3. David Lewis, Counterfactuals, Oxford, 1973.

  4. Donald, Nute, ‘Counterfactuals and the Similarity of Words [sic]’, Journal of Philosophy 21 (1975) 773–8.

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  5. Robert C. Stalnaker, ‘A Theory of Conditionals’, in Rescher, N., ed., Studies in Logical Theory, American Philosophical Quarterly supp. monographs, Oxford, 1968.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia

    Brian Ellis, Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter

Authors
  1. Brian Ellis
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  2. Frank Jackson
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  3. Robert Pargetter
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Ellis, B., Jackson, F. & Pargetter, R. An objection to possible-world semantics for counterfactual logics. J Philos Logic 6, 355–357 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00262069

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00262069

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