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A general possible worlds framework for reasoning about knowledge and belief

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Abstract

In this paper non-normal worlds semantics is presented as a basic, general, and unifying approach to epistemic logic. The semantical framework of non-normal worlds is compared to the model theories of several logics for knowledge and belief that were recently developed in Artificial Intelligence (AI). It is shown that every model for implicit and explicit belief (Levesque), for awareness, general awareness, and local reasoning (Fagin and Halpern), and for awareness and principles (van der Hoek and Meyer) induces a non-normal worlds model validating precisely the same formulas (of the language in question).

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Wansing, H. A general possible worlds framework for reasoning about knowledge and belief. Studia Logica 49, 523–539 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00370163

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