Abstract
Self-referential sentences have played a key role in Tarski's proof [9] of the non-definibility of arithmetic truth within arithmetic and Gödel's proof [2] of the incompleteness of Peano Arithmetic. In this article we consider some new methods of achieving self-reference in a uniform manner.
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Smullyan, R.M. Uniform self-reference. Stud Logica 44, 439–445 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00370432
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00370432