Abstract
The conditional,if an agent did something, then the agent could have done otherwise, is analyzed usingstit theory, which is a logic of “seeing to it that” based on agents making choices in the context of branching time. The truth of the conditional is found to be a subtle matter that depends on how it is interpreted (e.g., on what “otherwise” refers to, and on the difference between “could” and “might”) and also on whether or not there are “busy choosers” that can make infinitely many choices in a finite span of time.
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Belnap, N., Perloff, M. The way of the agent. Stud Logica 51, 463–484 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01028971
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01028971