Abstract
The paper argues that there are two main kinds of joint action, direct joint bringing about (or performing) something (expressed in terms of a DO-operator) and jointly seeing to it that something is the case (expressed in terms of a Stit-operator). The former kind of joint action contains conjunctive, disjunctive and sequential action and its central subkinds. While joint seeing to it that something is the case is argued to be necessarily intentional, direct joint performance can also be nonintentional. Actions performed by social groups are analyzed in terms of the notions of joint action (basically DO and Stit).
A precise semantical analysis of the aforementioned kinds of joint action is given in terms of “time-trees”. With each participant a tree is connected, and the trees are joined defining joint possible worlds in terms of state-expressing nodes from the trees. Sentences containing DO and Stit are semantically evaluated with respect to such joint possible worlds. Intentional joint actions are characterized in terms of the notion of “we-intention” (joint intention), characterized formally by means of a special operator.
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Sandu, G., Tuomela, R. Joint action and group action made precise. Synthese 105, 319–345 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063562
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063562