Abstract
Traits like simplicity and explanatory power have traditionally been treated as values internal to the sciences, constitutive rather than contextual. As such they are cognitive virtues. This essay contrasts a traditional set of such virtues with a set of alternative virtues drawn from feminist writings about the sciences. In certain theoretical contexts, the only reasons for preferring a traditional or an alternative virtue are socio-political. This undermines the notion that the traditional virtues can be considered purely cognitive.
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I am grateful to participants in the Indiana University Workshop on Social Values in the Context of Justification for their comments on an earlier, spoken, version of this paper.
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Longino, H.E. Gender, politics, and the theoretical virtues. Synthese 104, 383–397 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064506
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064506