Abstract
Building on developments in feminist science scholarship and the philosophy of science, I advocate two methodological principles as elements of a naturalized philosophy of science. One principle incorporates a holistic account of evidence inclusive of claims and theories informed by and/or expressive of politics and non-constitutive values; the second takes communities, rather than individual scientists, to be the primary loci of scientific knowledge. I use case studies to demonstrate that these methodological principles satisfy three criteria for naturalization accepted in naturalized philosophy of science, and allow for the differential assessment of episodes in which values and sociopolitical factors inform, or contribute to the adoption of, theories for which there is sufficient evidential warrant — and episodes in which such factors inform, or contribute to the adoption of, theories for which there is not. I contend that in terms of their empirical and normative import, these principles constitute a further naturalization of the philosophy of science.
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I am grateful to Richmond Campbell, Ingvar Johansson, Hildur Kalman, Peter Machamer, James Maffie, Jack Nelson, Elizabeth Potter, Phyllis Rooney, Joseph Rouse, and Nancy Tuana for constructive criticisms of earlier drafts. An earlier version was presented to the Nordiskt Nätverk för Feministisk Epistemologioch Feministisk Vetenskapsteorito, and the Institutionen för Filosfi och Vetenskapsteorito at Umeå Universitet, in October 1994. I am grateful to members of these audiences for challenging and insightful criticisms.
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Nelson, L.H. A feminist naturalized philosophy of science. Synthese 104, 399–421 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064507
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064507