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Correlated equilibrium and potential games

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Abstract

Any correlated equilibrium of a strategic game with bounded payoffs and convex strategy sets which has a smooth concave potential, is a mixture of pure strategy profiles which maximize the potential. If moreover, the strategy sets are compact and the potential is strictly concave, then the game has a unique correlated equilibrium.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 91904, Givat Ram, Jerusalem, Israel

    Abraham Neyman

  2. Institute for Decision Sciences, SUNY Stony Brook, 11794, Stony Brook, NY, USA

    Abraham Neyman

Authors
  1. Abraham Neyman
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Additional information

First version: November 1991. This research was supported by NSF Grant SES 8922610.

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Neyman, A. Correlated equilibrium and potential games. Int J Game Theory 26, 223–227 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01295851

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01295851

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