Conclusions
Reflecting onMoravcsik's paper and his assertion that a damaging dominant one-dimensionalism prevails within the science of science, one can draw the following conclusions. Firstly, the one-dimensionalism described byMoravcsik is a misrepresentation of a great deal of useful and valid “scientometric” research. This work is not so methodologically or theoretically naive asMoravcsik seeks to suggest, nor is it so uniform. Secondly,Moravcsik's assertion that there is little multidimensional work being carried out overlooks the considerable body of such research being published in the sociology of science. Thirdly, the sociology of science is but one sub-field of the science of science, and each such sub-field is characterized by its own sets of objectives and resource constraints. The nature of these objectives and constraints determines the relative suitability of particular methodologies and the optimal mix of methodologies. This in turn influences the relative frequency of adoption of those approaches which can be described as either “one-” or multidimensional. The result is that contrary to Moravcsik's assertions, a methodological pluralism already exists; a methodological pluralism which should be recognised as a natural consequence of the diversity of research objectives and constraints which characterize the science of science, as well as the wide range of disciplinary backgrounds of those who work within it.
As the science of science has itself shown, discussion of cognitive content should not be totally divorced from consideration of social context.
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References
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Gordon, M.D. Methodological pluralism in a multidimensional world. Scientometrics 6, 87–92 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02021281
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02021281