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Kombinatorische Auktionen in der betrieblichen Beschaffung

Eine Analyse grundlegender Entwurfsprobleme

An Analysis of Design Problems in Combinatorial Procurement Auctions

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Wirtschaftsinformatik

Abstract

Combinatorial auctions are promising auction formats for industrial and public procurement. Potential advantages of using combinatorial auctions include decreased overall spend, low transaction costs for multi-item negotiations, fairness and market transparency for suppliers, as well as high allocative efficiency. A number of fundamental design considerations are relevant to the application of combinatorial auctions in procurement. In addition, procurement specialists need to consider several domain-specific requirements, such as additional side constraints as well as alternative multidimensional bid types.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Lehrstuhl für Internetbasierte Geschäftssysteme, TU München Fakultät für Informatik (118), Boltzmannstr. 3, 85748, Garching/München, Deutschland

    Martin Bichler,  Alexander Pikovsky &  Thomas Setzer

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  1. Martin Bichler
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  2. Alexander Pikovsky
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  3. Thomas Setzer
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Correspondence to Martin Bichler.

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Bichler, M., Pikovsky, A. & Setzer, T. Kombinatorische Auktionen in der betrieblichen Beschaffung. Wirtschaftsinf 47, 126–134 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03250985

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