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La théorie des jeux non-coopératifs appliquée aux réseaux de télécommunication

Non-cooperative game theory applied to telecommunication networks

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Résumé

Dans cet article, nous exposons divers outils provenant de la théorie des jeux non-coopératifs qui permettent d’étudier des situations de compétition dans les réseaux de télécommunication. Nous décrivons les outils mathématiques tout en offrant des exemples de domaines de réseaux de télécommunication variés.

Abstract

In this paper, we present various tools originating from non-cooperative Game Theory, which allow us to study competition situations in telecommunication networks. We describe the mathematical tools while providing examples from a variety of areas in telecommunication networks.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. INRIA, B.P. 93, 2004 Route des Lucioles, 06902, Sophia-Antipolis Cedex, France

    Eitan Altman

  2. LIA, University of Avignon, Agroparc BP 1228, 84911, Avignon, France

    Rachid El-Azouzi

Authors
  1. Eitan Altman
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  2. Rachid El-Azouzi
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Altman, E., El-Azouzi, R. La théorie des jeux non-coopératifs appliquée aux réseaux de télécommunication. Ann. Telecommun. 62, 827–846 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03253292

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03253292

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