Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the close relations between the logic of theory change (alias belief revision) on the one hand, and nonmonotonic logic on the other. The connection is most manifest at the level of general conditions on nonmonotonic inference operations, compared to those on theory revision operations. It also appears between some of the specific constructions that have been used in the literature to generate such operations.
After discussing the connection in intuitive terms, we express it as a formal translation procedure, and examine the outcome of translating well-known postulates and conditions from one domain to the other. On the level of specific constructions, we show the exact relationship, which is very close to identity, between the procedure of theory revision known as "full meet revision" and Poole's procedure for generating "default" inference operations.
Several illustrations are given of how results already known in one of the two domains throw light on the other domain, and also how they may suggest interesting open questions.
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Makinson, D., Gärdenfors, P. (1991). Relations between the logic of theory change and nonmonotonic logic. In: Fuhrmann, A., Morreau, M. (eds) The Logic of Theory Change. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 465. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0018421
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0018421
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