Abstract
This paper investigates security proofs for protocols that employ asymmetric (public-key techniques to solve two problems: entity authentication and authenticated key transport.
A formal model is provided, and a definition of the goals within this model is supplied. Two protocols are presented and proven secure within this framework, given the existence of certain cryptographic primitives. The practical implementation of these protocols is discussed. We emphasize the relevance of these theoretical results to the security of systems used in practice. In particular, our results imply the security of some protocols standardized by ISO [15, 16] and NIST [20] in the model proposed.
This work is heavily influenced by the work of Bellare and Rogaway [1, 5], who demonstrate proven secure protocols for these problems using symmetric cryptosystems. Our paper is an extension of their work to the public-key setting.
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References
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Blake-Wilson, S., Menezes, A. (1998). Entity authentication and authenticated key transport protocols employing asymmetric techniques. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Lomas, M., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols. Security Protocols 1997. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1361. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0028166
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0028166
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