Abstract
In the quest for open systems, standardisation of security mechanisms, framework and protocols are becoming increasingly important. This puts high demands on the correctness of the standards.
In this paper we use a formal logic based approach to protocol analysis introduced by by Burrows, A badi and Needham in their paper “Authentication: A Practical Study in Belief and Action” [1]. We extend this logic to deal with protocols using public key cryptography, and with the notion of “duration” to capture some time related aspects. The extended logic is used to analyse an important CCITT standard, the X.509 Authentication Framework. Two claims relating to the assumptions necessary and the goals achieved using strong two-way authentication are proved.
We conclude that protocol analysis can benefit from the use of the notation and that it highlights important aspects of the protocol analysed. Some aspects of the formalism need further study.
Research sponsored by Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research under Grant IT 0333.22222
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References
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© 1990 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Gaarder, K., Snekkenes, E. (1990). On the formal analysis of PKCS authentication protocols. In: Seberry, J., Pieprzyk, J. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — AUSCRYPT '90. AUSCRYPT 1990. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 453. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0030355
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0030355
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