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An axiomatic interpretation of confidentiality demands in logic-based relational databases

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1154))

Abstract

Secure multilevel relational database models based on Bell and La Padula's interpretation of mandatory security policies suffer from severe semantic problems. We claim that the intention of these policies can be reduced to a single generic confidentiality demand. We interpret it in the context of a logic-based database as a distortion of the intended model and state it as an axiom in addition to the axioms of a relational database. We then show that many security properties can already be proved from these few axioms. These properties characterise a mandatory-security-policy-conforming database with an unequivocal semantics of the data and a notion of integrity identical to that of relational databases.

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Dino Pedreschi Carlo Zaniolo

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© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Spalka, A., Cremers, A.B. (1996). An axiomatic interpretation of confidentiality demands in logic-based relational databases. In: Pedreschi, D., Zaniolo, C. (eds) Logic in Databases. LID 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1154. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0031748

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0031748

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61814-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-70683-0

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